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Introduction
Numerous international courts and tribunals are now available to address
a broad range of international disputes.' One such court is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 created the ITLOS as part of its compulsory 3 third-party dispute settlement system. Because the Convention did
not enter into force until November 1994, 4 the ITLOS and the Convention's
other dispute settlement mechanisms 5 have only recently become available.
1. For a list of international courts and formal dispute settlement bodies, see
Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 69-70 (1997) [hereinafter Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement].
National courts also often decide issues of international law, and international legal
disputes are frequently addressed through negotiations and other informal processes.
For a survey of less formal interstate dispute settlement mechanisms, see David A.
Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law, 79
IowA L. REv. 769, 779-90 (1994).
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the
Sea Convention].
3. If all parties to a dispute have consented in advance of a dispute to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal, via treaty or declaration, that jurisdiction is
said to be "compulsory" or "obligatory." One party may then unilaterally institute proceedings against another consenting party in the specified forum.
4. The Convention is now being implemented together with the Agreement Relating
to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (1994), 1836 U.N.T.S. 3,
33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994) [hereinafter Part XI Agreement]; the latter modifies some of the
technical and institutional features of the Convention's regime for mining the sea-bed
that developed states had found problematic. For discussion of the mechanisms to
implement the Part XI Agreement, which is to be interpreted and applied together with
Part XI as a single instrument, see Moritaka Hayashi, The 1994 Agreement for the Universalization of the Law of the Sea Convention, 27 OcEAN DEV'T & INT'L L. 31 (1996).
5. The Convention also creates mechanisms for compulsory conciliation, arbitration, and (for disputes concerning fishing, the marine environment, marine scientific
research, and navigation) special arbitration before panels of experts. See infra notes 5660, 72-73 and accompanying text.
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The ITLOS, headquartered in Hamburg, Germany, is now fully operational.
It has already adjudicated cases and reached judgments in them. 6 The Law
of the Sea Convention has also been widely accepted. As of November
7
1998, there were 130 parties, including China, the European Union,
France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. 8
The Convention's widespread acceptance makes the ITLOS available to
address a variety of disputes.
Creation of the ITLOS has been controversial. The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) has considerable experience in deciding law of the sea
cases. 9 The availability of the ICJ and other dispute settlement options for
law of the sea disputes caused some people to worry that the ITLOS might
contribute to divergent jurisprudence. 10 Supporters of the ITLOS point
out, however, that the ITLOS can handle cases involving international organizations, individuals, and corporations" that the ICJ, by virtue of its Statute, is precluded from hearing. 12 Proponents of the ITLOS also argue that
the availability of a quick and efficient specialized tribunal, along with
judges who possess acknowledged expertise, make the creation of the
ITLOS a worthwhile enterprise. 13 The ITLOS may receive a significant case
load over time.
To analyze the actual and potential contributions of the ITLOS, it is
important to view the Tribunal as a participant in separate (albeit related)
6. See The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea)
(Request for Provisional Measures) (Mar. 11, 1998) (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/ord1103.htm>, 37 I.L.M. 1202 (1998) [hereinafter M/V Saiga
(No. 2)]; The M/V "Saiga" (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (Dec. 4, 1997)
(visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/judg_l.htm>, 37 I.L.M. 360
(1998) [hereinafter M/V Saiga Case].
7. The European Community shares competence with its member states with
respect to some foreign affairs issues, notably fisheries policy.
8. See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Oceans and
Law of the Sea (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/los94st.htm>
[hereinafter Div. for Ocean Affairs, Law of the Sea].
9. See Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in BusinessAgain?,
85 AM.J. INT'L L. 646, 653 (1991) (concluding the ICJ was "continuing full speed ahead
on its productive and convincing path toward mastery of the law of the sea."). The ICJ
and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have handed down
some 40 decisions and orders that involve the law of the sea. See Jonathan I. Charney,
The Implications of Expanding InternationalDispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 70 n.13 (1996) [hereinafter Charney,
Expanding Dispute Settlement Systems]; Mark W. Janis, The Law of the Sea Tribunal, in
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 245, 247-48 (Mark W. Janis ed.,

1992).
10. See 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAV OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
7 287.1, at 41 (Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B. Sohn eds., 1989) [hereinafter 5 COMMENTARY]; Manfred Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice, in
ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21, 43-44 (Frits Kal-

shoven et al. eds., 1980); Shigeru Oda, The InternationalCourt ofJustice Viewed from the
Bench (1976-1993), VII 244 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 144-48 (1993); infra notes 355-57.
11. See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
12. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 35, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
13. See Charney, Expanding Dispute Settlement Systems, supra note 9; Janis, supra
note 9.
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regimes. 1 4 A regime encompasses the rules, policies, and international
institutions related to an international issue area. 15 Although the ITLOS's
primary responsibility is to interpret and apply one treaty, the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention, the issues it may address and the roles it may fulfill
vary tremendously. The law of the sea contains rules governing a wide
range of issues, such as navigation, zones of coastal state jurisdiction and
control, maritime boundary delimitation, fisheries and other oceans
resources, marine scientific research, the marine environment, and mining
of the continental shelf and the deep sea bed. Some of these rules are of
long vintage, some were created during the negotiation of the Law of the
Sea Convention, and some have been developed subsequently. A variety of
international institutions and international treaty negotiations have relied
on the Convention as a framework agreement. 16 The different oceans law
regimes are not isolated from each other, but are linked by their ties to the
Law of the Sea Convention, to various international institutions, and to a
17
network of international law norms and compliance mechanisms.
Part I of this Article describes the origins of the ITLOS in the context
of the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention and its dispute settlement mechanisms. Part II illustrates some of the functions the ITLOS may
perform. Potential functions include: interpreting treaty provisions, providing legislative guidance for treaty parties, settling international disputes
involving private entities, acting as a public forum for the airing of highly
politicized interstate disputes, using equitable principles to assist in negotiations over a dispute, and engaging in a constitutional review of legislative
actions. This focus on the ITLOS's various functions provides a basis for
14. Situating any international tribunal in the context of specific regimes seems
indispensable, although general studies of the functions of the international courts also
aid our understanding. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BILDER, INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTE SETrLEMENT
AND THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATION 47-95 (1986) [hereinafter BILDER, INTERNATIONAL DIsPUT
SETTLEMENT]; John E. Noyes, The Third-Party Dispute Settlement Provisions of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Implications for States Parties and for
Nonparties, in ENmRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW Of THE SEA CONVENTION 213 (Myron H.

Nordquist &John Norton Moore eds., 1995) [hereinafter Noyes, Implications].
15. According to one standard definition, regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1992).
16. See, e.g., Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
opened for signatureDec. 4, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.167/37, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995)
(not yet in force) [hereinafter Straddling Stocks Agreement].
17. Many regard the Law of the Sea Convention, which emerged from the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, as an integrated "package deal." See,
e.g., Tommy T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in THE LAw OF THE SEA: UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA wITH INDEX AND FINAL ACT OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA xxxiii, xxxiv, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter LAw OF THE SEA DOCUMENTS]. For general discussion of
links between regimes, see ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 100-04 (1984).
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evaluating the significance of the Tribunal's work for other international
institutions, individuals, corporations, states, and national courts.' 8 Furthermore, this emphasis on judicial functions provides a starting point for
considering the different sorts of techniques that the ITLOS should employ
to carry out each of these functions effectively. 19 Finally, Part III explores
concerns that the creation of the ITLOS could lead to damaging, inconsistent jurisprudence or duplicative proceedings and argues that these concerns are insignificant.
I.

An Overview of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
and the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea

A. The Context: The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea contains extensive provisions on dispute settlement. 20 Any State Party to the Convention
or, in certain cases, another entity may refer a dispute related to the interpretation or application of the Convention or certain other international
agreements to an international tribunal to obtain a legally binding decision. Although the Convention contemplates that some disputes may be
taken to previously constituted bodies, e.g., the ICJ, it also provides for new
third-party tribunals, such as the ITLOS. The jurisdiction of any international court or tribunal over an interstate dispute ultimately rests on the
consent of the parties involved, 2 1 and acceptance of the Convention
expresses that consent for States Parties.
18. Some nonstate entities have legal "personality" and are recognized as subjects of
international law in their own right. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personalityand the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA.J. INT'L
L. 275 (1996); Mark W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 61 (1984). My concern is with the even broader community that enunciates

and interprets norms and that contributes to compliance with norms. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599, 2639-40
(1997). Despite this broad focus, I do not in this Article consider all the entities with
which the ITLOS may interact. For example, I do not consider the roles of nongovernmental organizations vis-A-vis the ITLOS. See generally Dinah Shelton, The Participation
of Nongovernmental Organizations in InternationalJudicialProceedings, 88 Am. J. INT'L L.
611 (1994).
19. Some factors bearing on the effectiveness of an international court, such as political relations among states or the decisions of states in the instrument creating the court

(e.g., decisions concerning the court's composition), are largely beyond its control. See
Laurence R Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997). See generallyTHOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
(1990).
20. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 74(2), 83(2), 151(8), 159(10),

LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS

162(2)(u)-(v), 165(2)(i)-(j), 186-91, 264, 279-99, 302; Annex iI, arts. 18(1)(b), 21(2);
Annex V; Annex V; Annex Vii; Annex VIII; Annex IX,art. 7. See also Part XI Agreement,
supra note 4, Annex, §§ 3.12, 6.1(f)-(g), 6.4, 8.1(0, 8(2).
21. With regard to interstate disputes, the requirement of mutual consent to international adjudication or arbitration provides an analog to the rules of sovereign immunity
that apply in most noncommercial cases in national courts.
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Most treaties relating to the international law of the sea have not provided for obligatory binding third-party dispute settlement. Informal dispute settlement mechanisms have been more common. 22 While the ICJ
and international arbitral bodies had decided many law of the sea cases
before the Convention entered into force, 23 their jurisdiction generally
depended on a special agreement (i.e., an agreement to submit just one
particular dispute to the tribunal) entered into after the dispute had
arisen. 2 4 At the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS I), states
adopted an optional protocol that provided for the compulsory settlement
of disputes. 25 The Convention now allows States Parties to invoke the obligatory binding third-party dispute settlement mechanisms of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in many oceans law disputes.
Why would states mutually consent to the jurisdiction of international
tribunals before a particular dispute arose? To answer this question, it is
important to understand the negotiating context of the Convention's dispute settlement provisions. The Convention was negotiated during a time
of considerable turmoil in ocean-related disputes. Technological developments had greatly increased the capacity to harvest both living and nonliving ocean resources, thereby increasing tensions over maritime boundaries.
Some developing states were asserting sovereignty over broad coastal
zones. Maritime powers, on the other hand, sought to safeguard their
hithertofore unimpeded passage through straits and other navigational
freedoms. States also disagreed about how to address numerous other
issues, such as the marine environment, marine scientific research, and a
regime for mining the sea bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which led to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
were extraordinarily complex. They involved more than 150 states and
lasted for nine years (preceded by an additional six years of U.N. committee
preparatory work). Although the Convention that emerged from UNCLOS
III accepts extensive coastal state control over broad coastal zones, it limits
the broadest unilateral claims of sovereignty over these zones and guarantees navigational freedoms to maritime powers. The Convention reflects
compromises and trade-offs concerning virtually every issue relating to the
26
oceans.
22. See, e.g., Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement, June 24, 1977, U.S.-U.K., art. VI,
T.I.A.S. No. 9140 (specifying categories of disputes subject to bilateral consultations).
23. See supra note 9.
24. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 3, 18
I.L.M. 397 (1979); Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. 13 (June 3). Cf. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993
I.CJ. 38 (June 14) (jurisdiction based on Article 36(2) of the ICJ's Statute).
25. Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169 (ratified by 37 states).
26. For studies of the UNCLOS III negotiations, see EDWARD L. MILES, GLOBAL OCEAN
POLrTICS: THE DECISION PROCESS AT THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA 1973-1982 (1998); CLYDE SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS: THE MAKING OF THE
LAW OF THE SEA (1987); Tommy T.B. Koh & Shanmugam Jayakumar, The Negotiating
Processof the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1 UNITED NATIONS
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Many negotiators at UNCLOS III thought that compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms could help cement the compromises embodied in the
Law of the Sea Convention. 2 7 Some delegates from developing states
believed that including third-party dispute settlement provisions in the
Convention would counterbalance political, economic, and military pressures from powerful states. 28 The United States sought such provisions to
deter new unilateral state claims that had questionable legal support and to
increase the weight given to the positive law norms set out in the Convention. 2 9 U.N. officials also favored strong dispute settlement provisions,
believing these could help maintain the integrity of the Convention's compromise "package deal." UNCLOS III President H.S. Amerasinghe, speaking in 1976, saw "the provision of effective dispute settlement procedures
as essential for stabilizing and maintaining the compromise necessary for
the attainment of agreement on a convention." 30 Absent such procedures,
31
he went on, "the compromise will disintegrate rapidly and permanently."
However, not all states favored the provisions for obligatory, binding
third-party dispute settlement. Two sets of tensions were evident. First,
while many states favored strong third-party dispute settlement, others
were skeptical. The skeptics included several African states, which traditionally relied on informal, consensus-building methods of dispute settlement in their own cultures. 3 2 Developing states distrusted the ICJ
throughout the 1970s because they believed that it favored developed
states. 3 3 Socialist states, reflecting their state-centric positivist views of
international law, questioned the need for third-party tribunals that possessed the authority to issue binding decisions in a wide range of cases.
The Law of the Sea Convention was the first general convention in which
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 29 (Myron H. Nordquist ed.,

1985).
27. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and other provi-

sions concerning the settlement of oceans law disputes do not stand alone as separate
protocols but are part of the UNCLOS III package. For accounts of the negotiating history of the Convention's dispute settlement provisions, see A.O. ADEDE, TiHE SYSTEM FOR
SETTLEMENT OF DispuTEs UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
A DRAFTING HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1987); 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10.

28. See ADEDE, supra note 27, at 39, 241.
29. See United States Policy for the Seabed, 62 DEP'T ST. BULL. 737 (1970); U.S.
PresentsProposalsat PreparatorySessionfor Law of the Sea Conference, 69 DEP'T ST.BULL.
397, 414 (1973) (statement by Ambassador Stevenson); Louis B. Sohn, U.S. Policy
Toward the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1976) [hereinafter
Sohn, U.S. Policy].
30. Memorandum by the President of the Conference on Document A/CONF.62/WP.9,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Add.1 (1976), 1 6, reprinted in V Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records 122, U.N. Sales No. E.76.V.8 (1976)
[hereinafter V Official Records].
31. Id.
32. See H.G. Darwin, General Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL
ASPECTS 57, 66-68 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 1972).
33.

See GURDIP SINGH, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA DISPUTE

SErLEMENT MEcHANISMS 72 (1985); R.P. Anand, Attitude of the "New" Asian-African

Countries Toward the InternationalCourt of Justice, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL LAw 163 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987).
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the Soviet Union, its allies, and African states agreed to provisions on bind34
ing third-party dispute settlement.
Second, with respect to roles of third-party tribunals, tensions existed
not only between the "maximalist" and "minimalist" states but also
between coastal and noncoastal states. During UNCLOS III, developing
coastal states asserting extensive claims over offshore zones argued against
outside oversight of their exercise of authority in these zones. Other states,
however, preferred outside, third-party review of the legality of such coastal
state exercise of authority. Membership in the maximalist and non-coastal
state camps, or in the minimalist and coastal state camps, did not necessarily overlap. For example, some coastal states that resisted any role for
third-party tribunals in disputes involving their exclusive economic zones
35
otherwise favored extensive jurisdiction for third-party tribunals.
Another issue at UNCLOS III concerned the management of mineral
resources in the "Area."3 6 The Convention refers to the Area and its
resources as "the common heritage of manldnd."3 7 The regime for sea-bed
mining, found in Part XI of the 1982 Convention as modified by the 1994
Part XI Implementation Agreement, 38 contains provisions on third-party
dispute settlement that are largely separate from those applicable to other
39
issues.
The ITLOS could not become operational until the Convention entered
into force. 40 Although the Law of the Sea Convention attracted 159 signatories when UNCLOS III concluded in 1982, the Convention did not gain
sufficient acceptances to enter into force until November 14, 1994.41
Between 1982 and 1994, developed states did not accept the Convention
because of certain technical and organizational concerns with the Part XI
34. See Louis B. Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does
UNCLOS III Point the Way?, 46 L. & CONrrEMP. PROBS. 195, 196 n.5 (1983) [hereinafter
Sohn, Peaceful Settlement].
35. See Shabtai Rosenne, Settlement of Fisheries Disputes in the Exclusive Economic
Zone, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 103 (1979) [hereinafter Rosenne, Settlement of Fisheries

Disputes].
36. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1) (defining the "Area" as "the
sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction").
37. Id. art. 136.
38. Part XI Agreement, supra note 4.
39. See id. Annex, §§ 3.12, 6.1(f)-(g), 6.4, 8.1(0, 8(2); Law of the Sea Convention,
supra note 2, arts. 186-91.
40. After the conclusion of UNCLOS III and before the Convention entered into
force, Special Commission 4 of the Preparatory Commission for the International SeaBed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Prepcom) undertook preparatory work relating to the establishment of the ITLOS. See Final Act of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Res. I, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/121 (1982), in LAw Of THE SEA DocuMENTs, supranote 17, at 158, 176; Report
of the PreparatoryCommission To Be Convened in Accordance with Annex VI, Article 4 of
the Convention RegardingPracticalArrangementsfor the Establishment of the International
Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/152 (1995) (4 volumes) [hereinafter
Prepcom Report].
41. The Convention entered into force one year after the deposit of the sixtieth
instrument of ratification or accession. See Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 2, art.
308(1).
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sea-bed mining regime. The 1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement,
which is to be interpreted together with the Convention as a single instrument, assuaged the concerns of most developed states. Developed and
developing states alike have now widely accepted the Convention as modified by the 1994 Agreement. 4 2 The Convention's dispute settlement provisions posed no obstacle to states' acceptance of the Convention and,
indeed, have garnered favorable comments by national officials. 43 Since
1994, the States Parties to the Convention, the U.N. General Assembly, and
44
the ITLOS have done much work to make the Tribunal fully operational.
The Convention's provisions establishing the ITLOS and defining its
jurisdiction were the product of difficult negotiations and political com42. The United States is one of the few major powers that has not yet accepted the
Convention. The President has submitted the Part XI Implementation Agreement and
the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent. See Message from the President
Transmitting the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, S. TREATY Doc. No.
39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Message from the President].
43. U.S. officials have supported the dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the
Sea Convention. See, e.g., J. Ashley Roach, Dispute Settlement in Specific Situations, 7
GEO. INT'L ENvT'L L. REv. 775 (1995); Sohn, U.S. Policy, supra note 29, at 11. The skepticism of some U.S. politicians about the desirability of U.S. participation in international
courts, see generallyJohn E. Noyes, The Functions of Compromissory Clauses in U.S. Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 831, 844-50 (1994) [hereinafter Noyes, Compromissory Clauses],
however, suggests that the Senate will debate the merits of the Convention's dispute
settlement provisions. For a critique of these provisions, see Marianne P. Gaertner, The
Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: Critique and Alternatives to the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 577
(1982) (noting North-South tensions during the UNCLOS III negotiations and suggesting the potential for bias of some mechanisms in favor of developing states.
44. Since 1994, meetings of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention have
elected judges of the Tribunal, adopted a budget for the Tribunal, and taken other steps
necessary for the ITLOS's operation. Work has been completed on an Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, opened
for signatureJuly 1, 1997, SPLOS/25 (1997), and on the Agreement on Cooperation and
Relationship Between the United Nations and the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, adopted Sept. 8, 1998, G.A. Res. 52/521, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 92d plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/521 (1998). See ITLOS, RelationshipAgreement with United Nations
Enters into Force (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Dept/los/Press/ITLOS/
ITLOS_16.htm>. These agreements acknowledge the international legal personality of
the Tribunal and its capacity to make treaties. The Tribunal has worked on its own
internal organization, adopting Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8, Oct. 28, 1997 (visited
Nov. 17, 1998) <http://wwwv.un.org/Depts/los/rules-e.htm> [hereinafter ITLOS Rules];
Guidelines Concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases Before the Tribunal,
ITLOS/9, Oct. 28, 1997 (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts.los/
guide.htm>; and a Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice of the Tribunal, ITLOS/
10, Oct. 31, 1997 (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Dept/los/itloslO.htm>.
See also ITLOS, Judges Conclude Sixth Session of the Tribunal (visited Nov. 17, 1998)
<http://www.un.org/Dept/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_18.htm> [hereinafter ITLOS Press
18] (reporting on internal ITLOS personnel and financial regulations). The U.N. General Assembly has also followed the Tribunal's progress. For a survey of the organizational developments since the entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention, see
Shabtai Rosenne, Establishingthe InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 806 (1995) [hereinafter Rosenne, Establishing the ITLOS]; Shabtai Rosenne,
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: 1996-97 Survey, 13 INT'L J. MAINm &
CoAsTAL L. 487 (1998) [hereinafter Rosenne, 1996-97 Survey].
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promises. This section has provided an overview of the UNCLOS III negotiations that led to the Law of the Sea Convention and the ITLOS. It is also
important to situate the Tribunal more particularly in the context of the
Convention's provisions concerning dispute settlement and other available
third-party mechanisms. The next section thus traces the contours of the
Convention's dispute settlement system, focusing on the elements that
characterize the system as a whole. Part I.C of this Article then describes
features of the ITLOS that distinguish it from other third-party dispute settlement options. Part II of this Article presents a more complete picture of
the ITLOS and analyzes its various functions.
B. The Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention
UNCLOS III created Convention provisions that authorize third-party
tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction to hear a wide range of oceans law
disputes. This system includes such features as flexibility in the choice of
third-party mechanisms, obligatory recourse to third-party tribunals that
can render binding decisions, limited scope of subject matter jurisdiction,
specified sources of applicable law, and limited possibilities for external
review over proceedings. This section discusses these features and their
4
connections to the political tensions in UNCLOS III. 5
1. Informal Mechanisms
Before examining the Law of the Sea Convention's third-party dispute settlement system, it is important to place that system in the context of the
Convention's general dispute settlement provisions. Section 1 of Part XV
contains these general provisions. 4 6 Article 279 obligates States Parties to
"settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of th[e] Convention by peaceful means in accordance with" Article
2(3) of the U.N. Charter, and to "seek a solution by the means indicated in"
Article 33(1) of the Charter.4 7 Article 283 explicitly requires States Parties
to exchange views regarding the settlement of disputes by negotiation or
other peaceful means.48
45. For overviews of the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Law of the Sea Convention, see, e.g., J.G. MEIUULLs, INTERNATIONAL DisumT S=EmENT 170-96 (3d ed.
1998); SINGH, supra note 33; A.O. Adede, The Basic Structure of the Disputes Settlement
Part of the Law of the Sea Convention, 11 OcEAN DEv'T & IrNr'L L. 125 (1982); E.D. Brown,
Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea: The UN Convention Regime, 21 MARINE POL'Y
17 (1997) [hereinafter Brown, Dispute Settlement]; John King Gamble, Jr., The 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Binding Dispute Settlement?, 9 B.U. INT'L LJ. 39 (1991);
John E. Noyes, Compulsory Third-PartyAdjudication and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675 (1989); Raymond Ranjeva, Settlement of
Disputes, in A HANDBOOK ON THE NEw LAW OF THE SEA 1333 (RenE-Jean Dupuy & Daniel
Vignes eds., 1991); Sohn, Peaceful Settlement, supra note 34.
46. Section 1 of Part XV also applies to disputes arising under Part XI. See Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 285.
47. Id. art. 279. The means indicated in Article 33(1) of the U.N. Charter include
"negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of [the parties'] own
choice." U.N. CHARrER art. 33, para. 1.
48. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 283.
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The primacy accorded informal dispute settlement mechanisms in the
Convention reflects the reality of interstate diplomatic practice. Legal advisors in foreign affairs offices face a large number of routine, and often technical, differences of opinion over the interpretation of treaties. States
resolve most disputes over the interpretation or application of the Law of
negotiation rather than through referring disthe Sea Convention through
49
parties.
third
to
putes
2. Choice of Third-Party Fora and ObligatoryJurisdiction To Render
Binding Decisions
If recourse to negotiation or other mechanisms contemplated under Section 1 of Part XV should fail to settle a dispute, parties may choose among
several third-party tribunals under Section 2 of Part XV. Article 287 offers
States Parties a choice of four third-party fora: the ITLOS, the ICJ, arbitration, or (in cases involving fisheries, protection of the marine environment,
marine scientific research, and navigation) special arbitration before
panels of experts. States may declare their preferred tribunal at any time.
The flexibility in Article 287 is the result of states' inability, during
UNCLOS III, to agree on a single third-party forum to which recourse
should be had when informal mechanisms failed to resolve a dispute.
Some states favored the ICJ. 50 They argued that its docket was not overly
full, that it had successfully dealt with several law of the sea cases, and that
a proliferation of tribunals might undercut the development of a uniform
jurisprudence on law of the sea issues. Other states favored arbitration,
criticizing the rigidity of standing tribunals and noting that arbitral tribunals could conduct their business expeditiously. 5 ' A third group of states
favored the "special arbitration" approach, which provided special procedures for navigation, fisheries, pollution, and marine scientific research
dispute6.52 These states stressed the technical nature of many law of the
sea disputes, arguing that experts nominated by technically competent
organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization, should be
the decision makers. The remaining group of states favored establishing a
new Law of the Sea Tribunal. 53 Some developing states in this group considered the ICJ too conservative and unrepresentative of worldwide legal
systems. Given that the ICJ's jurisdiction only extends to states, other
states in this last group wanted a standing tribunal that would be open to
international organizations, corporations, and individuals. Article 287
acknowledges these different interests.
The choice of third-party fora under Part XV is actually greater than
Article 287 suggests. Under Article 282, parties to a dispute may refer the
49. See, e.g., SHABTm RosENNE,

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAv OF TREATIEs

1945-1986, at

279-80, 346 (1989).
50.
ments
51.
52.
53.

E.g.,Japan and Sweden. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 1 287.1 (citing statein the UNCLOS III Plenary during 1976).
E.g., France and the United Kingdom. See id.
E.g., the Soviet Union and Eastern European states. See id.
E.g., several African and Latin American states. See id.
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dispute to a third-party tribunal different from one of the four noted in
Article 287, such as an ad hoc arbitral tribunal with a number of arbitrators different from the five specified in the Convention.5 4 According to
Article 282, when "through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or
otherwise" States Parties have agreed to settle a dispute by a procedure
entailing a binding decision, that procedure controls.5 5
Although states have a choice among fora, recourse to third-party dispute settlement is nonetheless obligatory. The Convention's drafters anticipated that parties to a dispute might not elect the same procedure. If the
complainant state and the respondent state choose different fora, arbitration will be used; and if a state fails to declare a preferred forum, its choice
defaults to arbitration.5 6 Thus, an arbitral tribunal usually has residual
compulsory jurisdiction under the Convention.5 7
Two other features confirm the obligatory nature of jurisdiction under
Section 2 of Part XV. First, the Convention's provisions disallow techniques that disputing parties historically have used to avoid interstate arbitrations. For example, a state's failure to appoint an arbitrator will not
prevent the creation of an arbitral tribunal, because outside parties - the
President of the ITLOS in the case of arbitration and the Secretary-General
of the United Nations in the case of special arbitration - are authorized to
appoint arbitrators should the parties fail to act within a specified time
58
limit.

Lack of agreement on an arbitral tribunal's procedures also will

not bar the arbitration, because the tribunal may determine its own procedures. 5 9 Furthermore, a state's failure to appear before an arbitral tribunal
will not prevent the tribunal from reaching a binding decision. 60 The statutes of the ITLOS and the ICJ, both courts with elected judges and established rules of procedure, also provide that default of appearance does not
54. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 3(a).
55. See also id. art. 280, which allows "States Parties to agree at any time to settle a
dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by
any peaceful means of their own choice." A variety of tribunals and chambers also may
decide Part XI sea-bed mining disputes, although the degree of flexibility under Part X1
is less than that available with respect to other disputes. See id. arts. 187-88; Annex VI,
arts. 35-36; Part XI Agreement, supra note 4, Annex, §§ 6 (1)(f)-(g), 6(4); infra notes 16168, 306-31 and accompanying text.
56. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 287(3), (5). Under some of the
formulations advocated during UNCLOS III, the ITLOS would have been the default
forum. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 11287.2; Ranjeva, supra note 45, at 1373.
Shabtai Rosenne has traced the evolution of Article 287 in depth. See Shabtai Rosenne,
UNCLOS III - The Montreux (Riphagen) Compromise, in REALISM IN LAw-MAKING 169
(Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds., 1986).
57. The ITLOS, however, has residual compulsory jurisdiction with respect to Article
292 applications seeking the prompt release of vessels and their crews and with respect
to provisional remedies. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 290(5), 292;
infra notes 134-35, 149-50 and accompanying text. The chambers of the ITLOS operating under Part XI also exercise compulsory jurisdiction. See infra notes 161-68, 306-31
and accompanying text.
58. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VII, art. 3(e); Annex VIII, art.

3(e).

59. See id. Annex VII, art. 5; Annex VIII, art. 4.
60. See id. Annex VII, art. 9; Annex VIII, art. 4.
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preclude judgments. 61
Second, the Convention generally prohibits reservations and exceptions to its articles. 62 Because the obligatory dispute settlement provisions
are found either in the main body of the Convention or in Annexes that
"form an integral part6 4of th[e] Convention," 63 states cannot avoid them by
making reservations.
The decisions of a third-party tribunal in contentious cases under Part
XI or Part XV are legally binding. The binding nature of these decisions is
made explicit in several articles of the Convention 65 and, with respect to
the ICJ, in the U.N. Charter and the Court's Statute. 66 As a formal matter,
except between the parties and in
a decision "shall have no binding force
67
dispute."
particular
that
respect of
3.

The Scope of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

During UNCLOS III, negotiators debated the desirability of obligatory
third-party dispute settlement. Those debates led to limitations on, and
optional exceptions to, the compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms of
Section 2 of Part XV. For example, disputes over the following issues are
not subject to automatic compulsory third-party proceedings before courts
or tribunals: military activities, law enforcement activities related to certain fisheries and marine scientific research matters, historic bays and
titles, maritime boundary delimitations, and situations in which the
United Nations Security Council is exercising functions assigned to it by
61. See id. Annex VI, art. 28; ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 53.
62. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 309 ("No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of
this Convention.").
63. Id. art. 318.
64. The Law of the Sea Convention only refers to reservations in Article 309, the
Article that provides reservations are generally prohibited. Article 298 of the Convention, however, authorizes States Parties to make limited exceptions to the applicability of
the provisions for obligatory third-party dispute settlement. See also id. art. 310 (permitting declarations and statements).
65. Id. arts. 188(2), 292(4), 296; Annex VI, arts. 15(5), 33, 39; Annex VII, art. 11;
Annex VIII, art. 4. Even provisional measures are legally binding. See id. art. 290(6);
infra note 148 and accompanying text.
66. U.N. CHaRER art. 94; ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 59.
67. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 296(2). Because the decisions of
the ITLOS, the ICJ, the chambers of those courts, arbitral tribunals, and special arbitral
tribunals are legally binding, states and other entities may well comply with them.
Other incentives that promote compliance with international law will also apply with
respect to decisions of courts and t~unals operating under the Convention. These

incentives include, for example, incorporation of international law into national legal
systems, concerns with reputation, and potential countermeasures. See generally Koh,
supra note 18. The Convention does contain a few provisions specifically directed at
mechanisms for compliance with ITLOS decisions. For example, decisions of the
ITLOS's Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber are explicitly said to be enforceable in national legal
systems. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 39. Accord id. Annex
III, art. 21(2). See infra notes 340-44 and accompanying text. The implications of a
decision or obligation being legally binding may of course extend well beyond concerns
with compliance. See, e.g., Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational
Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 583-84 (1983).
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the U.N. Charter. With respect to those categories of disputes, Article 298
provides that a state may "declare in writing that it does not accept any one
68
or more of' the Part XV, Section 2 procedures.
Article 297 also limits the applicability of Part XV, Section 2. A coastal
state does not have to submit to binding third-party dispute settlement procedures with respect to certain marine scientific research or fisheries disputes in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Part XV's treatment of EEZ fisheries disputes illustrates the difficult
negotiations and resulting complex compromises during UNCLOS III.
Some coastal states opposed third-party oversight of their actions in the
EEZ. 6 9 They succeeded in exempting significant categories of disputes
from the requirements of Part XV, Section 2. Article 297 provides that a
coastal state is "not obliged to accept the submission" to a third-party
tribunal
of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions
70
established in its conservation and management laws and regulations.
Furthermore, Article 294 assuaged the concerns of coastal states that they
might be harassed by unfounded claims. Article 294 allows courts or
tribunals to determine, in preliminary proceedings, whether a claim constitutes an abuse of legal process or whether prima facie it is not well71
founded. If the claim is not well-founded, no further action is taken.
The negotiations between coastal and non-coastal states led to an
innovative dispute settlement procedure for some controversial cases. A
coastal state will be subject to "compulsory conciliation" in certain categories of EEZ fishing disputes. For example, where a party alleges that "a
coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of another
State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living resources with
respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fishing," any party
68. As of November 1998, only 12 states had declared, under Article 298, that they
would not accept compulsory third-party dispute settlement with respect to all or some
of these categories of disputes. See THE LAw OF THE SEA: DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF THE SEA AND TO THE
AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF THE SEA 19-46, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS]; United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the

Sea, Declarationsand Statements (visited Nov. 15, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
los_decl.htm> [hereinafter Div. for Ocean Affairs, Declarationsand Statements]. An Article 298 declaration may be made not only on signing, ratifying, or acceding to the Convention, however, but at any time thereafter. Therefore, more states may in time select
the Article 298 optional exceptions. The U.S. Secretary of State recommends that the
United States, a signatory but not yet a party to the Convention, make such a declaration
with respect to all the Article 298 exceptions. See Message from the President, supra
note 42, at x, 85-87.
69. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
70. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 297(3)(a). See id. arts. 61-62.
71. See Ranjeva, supra note 45, at 1387-90.
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to the dispute may compel conciliation.7 2 Although the final product of a
conciliation is technically nonbinding, the procedure may contribute to the
settlement of disputes. 73 Thus, the settlement of some narrow categories
of EEZ fisheries disputes is not left entirely to negotiation. 74
Despite the Article 297 limitations and Article 298 optional exceptions, many disputes are subject to the compulsory third-party dispute settlement procedures of Part XV, Section 2 of the Convention if no settlement
can be reached informally. These include, for example, disputes relating to
navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables, high seas fisheries,
the prompt release of vessels, and marine pollution. The scope of disputes
subject to compulsory adjudication is broad. 75
4.

Applicable Sources of Law

Any international court or tribunal hearing a case under the Law of the Sea
Convention may draw on a variety of sources of law. Article 293 directs
courts or tribunals having jurisdiction under Section 2 of Part XV to apply
"this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible
with this Convention."7 6 Some Convention articles incorporate by reference "generally accepted international rules and standards" of the Interna72. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 297(3)(b)(ii). For other fishing
disputes in which compulsory conciliation is available, see id. art. 297(3)(b)(i), (iii).
Conciliation is also obligatory for certain disputes concerning marine scientific research
that otherwise fall within one of the limitations of Article 297, see id. art. 297(2)(b), and
for certain disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations and historic bays or titles
that are exempted from compulsory binding third-party dispute settlement under an
Article 298 declaration. See id. art. 298(1)(a). More broadly, conciliation, or any other
procedure, is available with respect to any dispute excluded under Article 297 or falling
within an Article 298 declaration, if the parties to the dispute so agree. See id. arts. 284,
299.
73. Several features of the Convention's conciliation articles suggest that the goal of
the conciliation procedure is to promote dispute settlement. For example, third states
may be invited to express their views before the conciliation commission, id. Annex V,
art. 4, and, implicitly, to put pressure on the disputing states to arrive at a settlement.
The conciliation commission also is to be proactive: it is directed to make proposals to
the parties to try to reach an amicable settlement, and to draw the parties' attention to
measures that might facilitate an amicable settlement. Id. Annex V, arts. 5-6. In addition, the final conciliation report is not released directly to the parties, but to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is to communicate the report to the parties and
receive their reactions. Id. Annex V, art. 7(1). The report also is to be communicated to
"appropriate international organizations." Id. art. 297(3)(d). This publicity may make
it politically more difficult for a party whose positions are not supported by the conciliator to reject the report. For discussion of conciliation, see Ranjeva, supra note 45, at
1345-58.
74. For discussion of the narrow scope of EEZ fisheries disputes that may be subject
to third-party process, see MOHAMED DAHMAmn, THE FISHERIES REGIME OF THE ExcLusIvE
ECONOMIC ZONE 121-22 (1987);JosP A. DE YTURRtAGA, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF FISHERIEs 148-51, 171 (1997); Rosenne, Settlement of FisheriesDisputes, supra note 35.
75. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 43. But see Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the
Law of the Sea Convention: Problemsof FragmentationandJurisdiction,46 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 37, 46-47 (1997) [hereinafter Boyle, Fragmentationand Jurisdiction].
76. Accord Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 23. With respect
to disputes arising under Part XI, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS is authorized to apply not only the sources noted in Article 293, but also the rules, regulations,
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tional Maritime Organization. 77 Such rules and standards apply even to
States Parties that have not separately accepted them. Other articles in the
Law of the Sea Convention refer to international law developed outside the
78
context of the law of the sea.
The "other rules of international law" applicable to disputes arising
under Part XV include customary international law and other non-treaty
sources of international law. 79 International courts and tribunals could
construe Article 293(1)'s "other rules of international law" language to
reach beyond law of the sea sources and could apply norms developed in
other contexts, such as generally accepted human rights norms. For example, to analyze allegations that one state's boarding of a flag state's vessel
was unauthorized and that the crew was mistreated, a court may need to
consider human rights norms not found in the Convention.8 0

Some treaties incorporate by reference the dispute settlement provisions of Law of the Sea Convention. 8 ' Such treaties may in turn authorize
third-party decision makers to apply a broad array of sources. For example, Article 30(5) of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement provides that
[a]ny court or tribunal to which a dispute has been submitted under [the
Agreement] shall apply the relevant provisions of the Convention [on the
Law of the Sea], of this Agreement and of any relevant subregional, regional
or global fisheries agreement, as well as generally accepted standards for the
conservation and management of living marine resources and other rules of
and procedures of the Sea-Bed Authority and, in appropriate cases, the terms of deep
sea-bed mining contracts. See id. Annex VI, art. 38. See also id. Annex 111, art. 21(1).
Article 293(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention also notes that a court or tribunal
with jurisdiction under Part XV, Section 2, may have the power to decide a case ex aequo
et bono. This discretion to decide a case according to what is right and good, without the
need to refer to rules in the Convention or to other sources of international law, is
expressly made subject to the agreement of the parties in the case. One suspects that
such agreement will rarely, if ever, be given. In their 80-year history, the International
Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice whose Statutes contain language similar to Article 293(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention, see ICJ Statute, supranote 12, art. 38(2) - have never decided a case on the basis of
ex aequo et bono.
77. See, e.g., Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 211(2), (5). For discussion of the meaning of the phrase "generally accepted," see INT'L LAw ASS'N COMM. ON
COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION RELATING TO MARINE POLLUTION, SECOND REPORT § 2.4.2
(1998).
78. See, e.g., Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 295 (referring to exhaustion of local remedies "where... required by international law"), 304 ("The provisions
of this Convention regarding responsibility and liability for damage are without prejudice to the application of existing rules and the development of further rules regarding
responsibility and liability under international law.").
79. See ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 38(1) (listing sources of international law
generally used even outside the ICJ).
80. See generally Bernard H. Oxman, Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399 (1997) [hereinafter Oxman,
1
Human Rights].
81. See, e.g., Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, arts. 7(4)-(6), 27-32. See
also Protocol to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Waste and Other Matter of 1972, Nov. 7, 1996, art. 16, IMO Doc. LC/SM 1/6
(1996), 36 I.L.M. 1, 15 (1997).
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international law not incompatible with the Convention, with a view to
of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
ensuring the conservation
82
fish stocks concerned.
5. Absence of External Controls
The courts and tribunals operating under the Law of the Sea Convention
generally are not subject to external control, a characteristic they share
with most international courts. No national court or other state entity can
formally review an international tribunal's use of law during a proceeding.
No external authority may compel entities to participate in the process.
And no institution may formally review the tribunal's application of the
83
law.
The Law of the Sea Convention explicitly authorizes one court or tribunal to oversee the decisions of another only in three respects. First, if
the ITLOS is called on to make a provisional ruling, a subsequently constituted arbitral tribunal (or other mutually agreed forum) may "modify,
revoke or affirm" provisional measures prescribed by the ITLOS. 8 4 Second, in one circumstance under Part XI, a chamber of the ITLOS may rule
on an issue involved in an ongoing case before another tribunal. When a
commercial arbitral tribunal adjudicates a sea-bed mining contract dispute,
it lacks jurisdiction to interpret the Convention. Instead, the interpretation
of Part XI "shall be referred to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber for a ruling."8 5 Third, the Convention permits the parties in an arbitration to agree
specifically to allow an appellate procedure. 8 6 In most respects, however,
the Convention does not allow external review or control over decisions of
the third-party tribunals operating under Parts X1 and XV of the
Convention.
Thus, controls to insure that procedures are fair and that rulings do
established powers will be largely internal to the international
exceed
not
court or tribunal. As Michael Reisman has noted, such controls include
following regularized formalities, requiring reasoned written decisions,
82. Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, art. 30(5). Once the Straddling
Stocks Agreement enters into force, parties to it that are involved in a dispute among
themselves may use the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Law of the Sea Convention and invoke the sources in Article 30(5) of the Agreement. This is true even if they
are not also States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. See id. art. 30(1)-(2).
83. See W. MicHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION (1992); David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunaland the Evolving Structure of InternationalDispute Resolution, 84 Am. J. INT'L L.
104, 111 (1990) [hereinafter Caron, Claims Tribunal]. By contrast, in international commercial arbitrations between private parties, national courts typically are available to
determine the scope of arbitral clauses and review the fairness of arbitral procedures.
See id. at 115; William W. Park, National Law and CommercialJustice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in InternationalArbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 654-57, 674 (1989).
84. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 290(5).
85. Id. art. 188(2)(a).
86. Id. Annex VII, art. 11; Annex VIII, art. 4. See also Chairman'sSummary of Discussions on the Draft Rules of the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
LOS/PCN/SCN.4/L.4 (1985), in 3 Prepcom Report, supra note 40, at 55, 57-58.
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and complying with pressures of learned peers.8 7
6. Summary

The competing interests and compromises at UNCLOS III explain many
features of the dispute settlement system under Part XV of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Choice of forum provisions were a response
to the lack of consensus on one third-party court or tribunal. The exceptions from compulsory third-party proceedings for most EEZ fishing disputes and for other sensitive disputes accommodated many of the concerns
of coastal states and of states skeptical about any role for formal thirdparty tribunals. In response to the desire of most states to strengthen the
rule of law in ocean disputes, however, the Convention ensured that jurisdiction of such tribunals was in fact obligatory and third-party decisions
binding.
Under what circumstances will a state prefer the newly created ITLOS
over other dispute settlement options of the Convention? Section C highlights those features of the ITLOS that set it apart from the Convention's
other dispute settlement options. It also describes the categories of cases
in which the Convention accords the ITLOS or its chambers a prominent
role.
C. Features of the ITLOS
1.

Composition of the ITLOS and Its Chambers

Article 2 of the ITLOS Statute prescribes two of the basic qualifications for
a judge of the ITLOS. First, the judge must possess expertise in the international law of the sea. Second, the judge must be fair and impartial.
States Parties to the Convention elect twenty-one judges for renewable nineyear terms "from among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of recognized competence in the field of the law of
the sea."8 8 Some provisions of the Tribunal's Statute emphasize the importance of judicial impartiality. Judges may not, for example, have a financial
interest in operations connected with oceans resources or have acted as
legal counsel for one of the parties. 89
The ITLOS "as a whole" must represent "the principal legal systems of
87. See REisMAN, supra note 83, at 1.
88. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 2(1). For a discussion of
the desirability of the requirement that judges on international courts have previous
experience as judges of national courts, see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 300-01
(linking this feature to the legitimacy of constitutional interpretations by the European
Court of Justice). Such a requirement is helpful when international tribunals depend
regularly on national courts to accept their judgments. Although some of the ITLOS's
decisions - particularly those discussed in Part II.A of this Article - require acceptance
by national courts, expertise in the international law of the sea seems more likely to
enhance the prestige of the Tribunal than the familiarity of its judges to national
judiciaries.
89. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, arts. 7-8. For discussion
of the requirement that judges of the ITLOS be independent, see NIELS-J. SEEBERGELVERFELDT, THE SETTLEMENT OF DisPuTEs IN DEEP SEABED MINING 48-51 (1998). See also
Peter H.F. Bekker, Correspondence, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1996); Detlev F. Vagts, The
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the world." 90 States Parties nominate and elect judges, 9 ' and "each geographical group as established by the General Assembly of the United
Nations" is to be represented by at least three members. 92 In any particular case, each party also is entitled to have on the bench a member of its
93
nationality or choice.
The Tribunal's twenty-one judges were elected and sworn into office in
1996. 94 They include academics with expertise in the law of the sea and
officials familiar with the law of the sea through their involvement with
95
UNCLOS I1.
Although they hail from many different states, voting patterns in the ITLOS's first decision revealed no division along geographical
96
or geo-political lines.

The availability of ITLOS chambers, which are in several respects different from ICJ chambers, 9 7 may prove attractive to some states. The StatInternationalLegal Profession: A Need for More Governance?, 90 Am.J. INT'L L. 250, 25152, 255-57 (1996).
90. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 2(2).
91. See id. Annex VI, art. 4.
92. Id. Annex VI, art. 3(2). These geographical groups are the African, Asian, eastern European, Latin American and Caribbean, and western European and other states.
See G.A. Res. 1192, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., 728th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/3781 (1957).
93. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 17. The Statute of the International Court ofJustice includes a similar provision. ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 31.
94. The 21 judges are Joseph Ai (Lebanon), David Anderson (United Kingdom),
Hugo Caminos (Argentina), Gudmundur Eiriksson (Iceland), Paul Engo (Cameroon),
Anatoly Kolodldn (Russia), Edward Laing (Belize), Vicente Marotta Rangel (Brazil),
Mohamed Marsit (Tunisia), Thomas Mensah (Ghana) (President), Tafsir Malick Ndiaye
(Senegal), L. Dolliver Nelson (Grenada), Park Choon-Ho (South Korea), P. Chandrasekhara Rao (India), Tulio Treves (Italy), Budislav Vukas (Croatia), Joseph Warioba
(Tanzania), Rfidiger Wolfrum (Germany) (Vice President), Soji Yamamoto (Japan), Alexander Yankov (Bulgaria), and Zhao Lihai (China). According to one observer, although
an equitable geographical distribution of ITLOS judges is evident, "the element of the
representation of the principal legal systems of the world played virtually no role" in the
first election. SEEBERG-ELVERFIELDT, supra note 89, at 56. Furthermore, as Shabtai
Rosenne has remarked, an underrepresentation of Pacific Rim states and the absence of
any women judges were notable outcomes of this first election. See Rosenne, 1996-97
Survey, supra note 44, at 492. For discussion of the election, see id. at 490-92. For
discussion of other steps taken to establish the Tribunal, see Rosenne, Establishing the

ITLOS, supra note 44.
95. Biographies of the judges appear in CurriculaVitae of Candidates Nominated by
States Partiesfor Election to the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea: Note by the
Secretary-General,SPLOS/11 (1996).
96. See Eli Lauterpacht, The FirstDecision of the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of
the Sea: The M/V Saiga, in LiBER AMERIcORUM PROFESSOR IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN
395, 417 (Gerhard Hafner et al. eds., 1998); Bernard H. Oxman, InternationalDecision,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 278, 279 n.4 (1998). The States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention that, as of November 1998, have filed declarations under Article 287 accepting the
Tribunal's jurisdiction are also geographically diverse. See infra note 112.
97. See ICJ Statute, supra note 12, arts. 26, 29. For discussion of the use of chambers in the International Court ofJustice, see, e.g., Monroe Leigh & Stephan D. Ramsey,
Confidence in the Court: It Need Not Be a "Hollow Chamber," in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JuSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 106, 111-17 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987);
Edward McWhinney, Special ChambersWithin the InternationalCourt ofJustice: The Preliminary, ProceduralAspect of the Gulf of Maine Case, 12 SYR.J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (1985).
For a comparison of chambers under the ITLOS's Statute and under the ICJ's, see
Shabtai Rosenne, The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea and the International
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ute of the ITLOS allows consenting parties to choose chambers that are
composed of a few expert judges. 98 The ITLOS has formed two standing
special chambers to address problems that require specific expertise. 9 9
One is the Chamber on Fisheries Matters, and the second is the Chamber
on the Marine Environment. In addition, the ITLOS has established a
Chamber of Summary Procedure, which, at the request of parties to a dispute, can deal on a summary basis with any case that could be submitted
to the full Tribunal. 10 0 The Law of the Sea Convention also provides for an
ad hoc chamber of the full Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, which is the entity
with the primary adjudicatory role under Part XI. 101 Finally, the ITLOS
has the power to establish ad hoc chambers for particular cases at the
request of the parties. 10 2 The availability of chambers allows parties to
choose a forum for either its efficiencies or its particular expertise.
The members of these various chambers are selected by the Tribunal's
judges, rather than by the States Parties. 10 3 The disputing parties must
approve the composition of an ad hoc chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber or of a chamber of the ITLOS established to deal with a dispute
under Part XV. 10 4 The Tribunal's deference to parties' wishes concerning
the composition of these chambers also makes the Convention's dispute
settlement system more flexible.
2.

The Conduct of Business by the ITLOS

Whether the ITLOS will evolve into a respected international court
depends on how it conducts its business. Are its decisions well-reasoned?
Does it use standard methods of treaty interpretation? Does it adhere to
the intent of the treaty drafters? Is it efficient? According to observers of
other international courts and tribunals,' 0 5 these factors bear on an international court's effectiveness. The ITLOS's early decisions may indicate
how it approaches its work. Part II.A of this Article uses the ITLOS's first
decision to analyze one of the Tribunal's roles.
Court of Justice: Some Points of Difference, in THE BALTIc SEA: NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN
NATIONAL POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERmAnON

200, 212-13 (Renate Platz6der &

Philom~ne Verlaan eds., 1996) [hereinafter Rosenne, Points of Difference].
98. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 15; ITLOS Rules,
supra note 44, arts. 28-31.
99. See Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Law of the Sea, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 39, 1 37, U.N. Doc. A/52/487 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
Report of the Secretary-General].
100. See id.; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 15(3); 1TLOS
Press 18, supra note 44.
101. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 36.
102. See id. Annex VI, art. 15(2).
103. See id. Annex VI, arts. 15(1), 35(1); ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, arts. 23, 28-30.
The composition of an ad hoc chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber is determined
by the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber with the approval of the parties, rather than by the full
Tribunal. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 36.
104. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, arts. 15(2), 36; ITLOS
Rules, supra note 44, arts. 27, 30(2)-(3).
105. See, e.g., RElSMAN, supra note 83; Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 19.
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Potential users of the ITLOS will also need to evaluate its procedural
rules to understand how it will function. Consider, for example, the
detailed rules concerning the ITLOS's fact-finding capacity. Tribunals gain
credibility if they have the ability to develop a thorough and accurate factual record. As Helfer and Slaughter point out, "[a] guaranteed capacity to
generate facts that have been independently evaluated, either through a
third-party fact-finding process or through the public contestation inherent
in the adversary system,
helps counter the perception of self-serving or
'political' judgments." 10 6
States at UNCLOS III provided minimal guidance with respect to the
fact-finding capacity of the ITLOS. Article 27 of the Court's Statute simply
provides that the ITLOS shall "make all arrangements for the taking of evidence." 10 7 Rules of the ITLOS, however, set out detailed rules governing
the taking of evidence.' 0 8 They provide for the collection and evaluation of
evidence through written and oral proceedings and certified copies of documents. The ITLOS may arrange for witnesses and experts to give evidence and may itself examine the parties and witnesses. It may "at any
time call upon the parties to produce" any evidence or explanations the
ITLOS considers "necessary for the elucidation of any aspect of the matter
in issue, or may itself seek other information for this purpose,"'1 9 and it
may request relevant information from nonparty intergovernmental organizations. The ITLOS may also revise a judgment if a material fact, unknown
at the time of the case, is subsequently discovered. Overall, the ITLOS's
rules provide a comprehensive system for gathering and evaluating facts.
3.

Features of the Law of the Sea Convention Bearing on the Use of the
ITLOS

The Law of the Sea Convention and the Statute of the ITLOS (Annex VI of
the Convention) contain provisions, relating to access to the Tribunal and
its jurisdiction, that suggest the ITLOS may receive more use than the ICJ
or other tribunals in several situations. The following discussion first
examines the provisions concerning access to the ITLOS. It then analyzes
the types of cases - Article 292 prompt release cases, cases involving provisional measures, cases in which advisory opinions are sought, and Part
XI sea-bed mining cases - in which the Convention accords the ITLOS a
particularly significant role.
106. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 303.
107. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 27. See also id.art. 289
(stating that a court or tribunal hearing a dispute involving scientific or technical mat-

ters may, either on its own motion or at the request of a party, select scientific or technical experts).
108. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, arts. 15, 60, 62-63, 71-72, 75-79, 80-82, 84, 87,
92-93, 96(7), 97(5), 127-28. Special Commission 4 of the Prepcom, working during
1982-1994, developed the draft of the Tribunal's Rules. See Final Draft Rules of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in ProvisionalReport of Special Commission
4, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/WP.16/Add.1 (1994), reprinted in 1 Prepcom Report,
supra note 40, at 26, 32.
109. ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, art. 77(1).
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Access to and Jurisdiction of the ITLOS

The Law of the Sea Convention contemplates that states will be the primary users of the ITLOS. The Convention expressly grants States Parties
access to the ITLOS and its chambers. 110 Numerous provisions in the Convention contemplate that States Parties will bring claims to the ITLOS.111
Mutual declarations of states accepting the jurisdiction of the ITLOS under
Part XV provide one way for the ITLOS to obtain jurisdiction over an interstate dispute. 112 States - even those not parties to the Law of the Sea
Convention - may also gain access to the ITLOS if they so agree in another
treaty or agreement, and the ITLOS will have jurisdiction over the disputes
13
specified in that treaty or agreement.'
Although only states may appear as parties before the ICJ, other entities may appear before the ITLOS and other third-party tribunals under the
Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention's definition of "States Parties"
110. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 291(1); Annex VI, arts. 20(1), 37.
111. See id. arts. 188, 287, 288(3), 290, 292(2); Annex VI, arts. 20-22. See also id.
Annex VI, arts. 31-32 (on intervention). The Statute of the ITLOS addresses both the
Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione personae and rationemateriaein the same section. See 5
COMMENTARY, supra note 10, clA.VI.112, at 373.
112. Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 2, arts. 287-88. The 13 States Parties that,
as of November 1998, have filed such declarations are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Cape
Verde, Chile, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Oman, Portugal, the United Republic of
Tanzania, and Uruguay. For the text of declarations, see DECARATIONS AND STATEMENTS,
supra note 68, at 19-46; Div. for Ocean Affairs, Declarationsand Statements, supra note
68. For a summary of declarations concerning the settlement of disputes, see United
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes Mechanism (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/lossdml.htm>. Only
Greece, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Uruguay named the ITLOS alone as their
preferred forum, although Uruguay added the caveat that its choice of the ITLOS was
"without prejudice to its recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice and of such agreements with other States as may provide for other means for
peaceful settlement." Seven states - Argentina, Austria, Cape Verde, Chile, Germany,
Oman, and Portugal - listed the ITLOS first, followed by at least one other forum; of
these seven states, all but Oman and Portugal explicitly stated that their choices were
listed "in order of preference" or "in the following order." Finally, Belgium listed both
the ITLOS and the ICJ, Finland chose "the International Court ofJustice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea," and Italy chose "the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, without specifying that one
has precedence over the other." For further discussion of the choice of procedure by
States Parties under Article 287, see Brown, Dispute Settlement, supra note 45, at 17.
113. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 288(2), 291(2); Annex VI, arts.
20-22. Thus, for example, the Straddling Stocks Agreement provides that
[t]he provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the
Law of the Sea Convention apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between States
Parties to this Agreement concerning the interpretation or application of this
Agreement, whether or not they are also Parties to the Convention.
Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, art. 30(1). See also id. arts. 30(2)-(4). For
discussion of the dispute settlement provisions of the Straddling Stocks Agreement, see
Ted L. McDorman, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Straddlingand Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks Convention, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1999). See also Draft Agreement
on Free Transit Through the Territory of Croatia to and From the Port of Ploce and
Through the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Neum, Sept. 8, 1998, Croat.-Bosn.
& Herz., art. 9(2) (parties shall request the ITLOS to nominate the President of a supervisory commission).
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is not limited to states. 114 The definition includes other entities entitled to
become parties to the Convention, such as territories with full internal selfgovernance and international organizations with treaty-making competence. 115 The Convention's third-party dispute settlement mechanisms are
also "open to entities other than States Parties," but "only as specifically
provided for" in the Convention. 1 16 Such entities include the International
Sea-Bed Authority1 17 and natural and juridical persons. 1 18
The ITLOS may exercise jurisdiction in some cases where individuals
or corporations are parties, although such jurisdiction is less extensive
than some initially proposed. Arvid Pardo's 1971 draft treaty concerning
International Ocean Space institutions' 19 included a proposal for an International Maritime Court with jurisdiction over natural and juridical persons "with respect to matters which have occurred in International Ocean
Space." 120 No general Ocean Space institution emerged from UNCLOS III,
however, and the Convention's provisions authorize only limited individual
access to the ITLOS. The Soviet Union and its allies were reluctant to
accept obligatory third-party dispute settlement mechanisms 12 1 and
resisted access for natural or juridical persons, particularly in cases against
states. Opponents cited traditional state-centric views of international law
and invoked "sovereignty" in arguing against proposals for broad judicial
access both for international organizations and for natural and juridical
114. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2)(2); see id. arts. 305-06.
115. See id. arts. 305-06; id. Annex IX, art. 1. This definition encompasses the European Union. Annex IX of the Convention contains a complementary provision authorizing such an intergovernmental organization to appear as a party in cases before the
ITLOS, an arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal. See id. Annex IX, art. 7. See
also Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, art. 47 (addressing participation by
international organizations).
116. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 291(2). See Boyle, Fragmentation
and Jurisdiction,supra note 75, at 52-54.
117. The Sea-Bed Authority has access to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the
ITLOS, and the Chamber has jurisdiction in cases in which the Authority is a party
under Part XI. See infra notes 323, 328-31 and accompanying text.
118. For discussion of the concept of "juridical person" as used in the Convention,
see SEEBERG-ELVERFELDT, supra note 89, at 73-75.
119. Draft ocean space treaty: Working paper submitted by Malta, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.138/53 (1971), reprintedin Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 26"' year,
Supp. No. 21, at 105-93, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971), and in STAFF OF SENATE COM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SEABED COMMITTEE, THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND MARINE MINERAL DEVELOPMENT 168 (Comm. Print 1971)

[hereinafter Draft Ocean Space Treaty].
120. See id. art. 161; Louis B. Sohn, Managingthe Law of the Sea: Ambassador Pardo's
Forgotten Second Idea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 291-92 (1997). A natural or
juridical person that did not comply with a decision rendered against it also was to be

subject to sanctions, including preclusion from use of the oceans. Draft Ocean Space
Treaty, supra note 119, art. 162(4); see id. art. 149. The United States also favored individual access to third-party tribunals. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/97, art. 8(2), reprintedin
2 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond
the Limits of NationalJurisdiction,U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 22, U.N. Doc.
A/9021 (1973), quoted in 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 1 292.1; V Official Records,
supra note 30, 61st plen. mtg., 1 20.

121. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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persons. 122
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, natural or juridical persons
may have access to the ITLOS in at least two types of cases. First, Article
292(2) contemplates individual access to the ITLOS to seek the prompt
release of vessels and crews detained by a coastal state when such access is
authorized by the flag state of the detained vessel. 12 3 Second, natural or
juridical persons may bring Part XI claims to the ITLOS's Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber; some Part XI claims may also be brought against natural or
124
juridical persons there.
In addition, a literal reading of the Statute of the ITLOS might allow
the ITLOS to hear disputes involving private parties that are submitted pursuant to agreements conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 12 5 Article 20
of the Statute grants nonstate entities access to the ITLOS not only in cases
provided for in Part XI, but also "in any case submitted pursuant to any
other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the ITLOS which is accepted by
all the parties to that case."1 26 Article 21 of the Statute complements Article 20, authorizing jurisdiction over "all matters specifically provided for in
any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal."'1 27 The
Statute of the ITLOS forms an integral part of the Law of the Sea Convention. 128 Nevertheless, the main jurisdictional article of the Convention,
Article 288(2), refers to "international agreements," rather than "agreements," and the ITLOS's current Rules do not explicitly contemplate the
Tribunal exercising jurisdiction in nonsea-bed mining private party disputes submitted pursuant to agreement. 12 9
122. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, '[291.5.
123. Article 292(2) is discussed in detail in Part lI.A infra.
124. The access of natural and juridical persons to tribunals in Part XI disputes is
qualified by Article 190 of the Convention. This Article allows a "sponsoring State" of a
natural or juridical person to submit written or oral statements if such a person is a
party to a dispute. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 190(1). The Article
also allows State Parties against whom a natural or juridical person has brought a claim
to ask that person's sponsoring state to "appear in the proceedings on behalf of that
person. Failing such appearance, the respondent State Party may arrange to be represented by a juridical person of its nationality." Id. art. 190(2). According to one official
involved with negotiating the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS 1I1,Article 190
"emerged as part of a continued reluctance of states to be sued directly in an international forum by natural or juridical persons." ADEDE, supra note 27, at 275. For further
discussion of Article 190, see SEEBERc-ELVERFELDT, supra note 89, at 143-47. Part lI.C of
this Article discusses the role of the ITLOS in sea-bed mining cases in greater detail.
125. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, arts. 20-21; id. arts.
291(2), 308.
126. Id. Annex VI, art. 20(2) (emphasis added).
127. Id. Annex VI, art. 21 (emphasis added). For the history of Articles 20 and 21 of
the Statute, see 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 'H A.VI.113-.128.
128. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 318.
129. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, arts. 57 (referencing disputes to which international organizations are party), 138 (concerning advisory opinions submitted pursuant
to "an international agreement" related to the Convention's purposes). See also Chairman's Summary of Discussionson the Draft Rules of the InternationalTribunalfor the Law
of the Sea: Addendum, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/L.7/Add.1 (1987), in 3 Prepcom
Report, supra note 40, at 103, 104-05 [hereinafter 1987 Prepcom Summary]; Chairman's
Summing up of the Discussions,U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/L.1 (1984), in 3 id. at 11, 13-
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If this "any other agreement" basis for jurisdiction and access of individuals to the ITLOS were to be allowed, it could apply to a broad range of
situations. For example, shipowners might enter agreements with flag or
coastal states to allow the ITLOS to decide disputes concerning how IMO
regulations or international environmental rules apply to vessels. 130 The
subject matter of any agreement providing for jurisdiction of the ITLOS
would probably relate closely to the law of the sea, given the expertise of
13 1
judges of the ITLOS.
b. Disputes Concerning the Prompt Release of Vessels and Their Crews
Under Article 292 of the Law of the Sea Convention, the ITLOS may have
jurisdiction over applications for the prompt release of vessels and their
crews, even when the disputing parties have not separately accepted the
ITLOS's jurisdiction. The Article concerns one particular situation in
which the actions of coastal states are subject to third-party review. When
a coastal state detains a vessel and allegations "that the detaining State has
not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release
of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other
financial security" 13 2 can be established, an international tribunal may
order the release of the vessel or its crew on the posting of a reasonable
bond or other financial security. The United States, concerned with the
seizures of U.S. fishing vessels in the 1960's, was one of the chief propo133
nents of a prompt release mechanism during UNCLOS I1.

15; Statement by the Chairman: Access by entities other than States, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/
SCN.4/1984/CRP.4 (1984), in 3 id. at 369; Boyle, FragmentationandJurisdiction,supra
note 75, at 53 (Article 20(2) of the ITLOS Statute provides "the basis for believing that
the ITLOS is open" to international organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
"other entities which are not States or whose international status is doubtful, such as
Taiwan," and "fishing entities" noted in the Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16,
art. 1(3)). In the event of a dispute concerning whether the ITLOS has jurisdiction over
a dispute involving non-state entities, the ITLOS itself will decide the matter. See Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 288(4); ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, art. 58.
130. Whether agreements solely between private parties could confer jurisdiction on
the ITLOS is questionable. Although some such agreements relate to oceans issues, e.g.,
Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP), Jan. 7, 1969, 8 l.L.M. 497 (discontinued in 1997), the settlement of many
disputes relating to private agreements would not require recourse to international law.
See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the
ITLOS may, however, hear disputes concerning private contracts related to sea-bed mining, under Article 187(c)(i) of the Law of the Sea Convention. See SEEBERG-ELVERFELDT,
supra note 89, at 124-26.
131. Although Article 288(2) provides that when jurisdiction is exercised over disputes concerning international agreements, such agreements must be "related to the
purposes of [the] Convention," nothing in the Statute of the Tribunal explicitly limits the
Tribunal's "any other agreement" jurisdiction to disputes involving law of the sea matters. It is thus conceivable that non-state entities could enter agreements to refer a variety of disputes to the Tribunal. See Boyle, FragmentationandJurisdiction,supra note 75,
at 49-50.
132. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 292.
133. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/97, supra note 120, art. 8(2); V Official Records, supra
note 30, 61st plen. mtg., cl 20. The U.S. position probably took account of seizures of
U.S. fishing vessels by certain Latin American states, which resulted in prolonged deten-
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Article 292 grants residual compulsory jurisdiction to the ITLOS,
rather than an arbitral tribunal, when the parties are unable to agree on a
tribunal. 13 4 Delays in constituting an arbitral tribunal could frustrate the
quick time frame allotted for prompt release cases. 135 Given this concern,
13 6
allocating residual jurisdiction to a standing tribunal is advantageous.
Scholars disagree on the scope of Article 292, particularly with respect
to the Article's requirement that an application for prompt release allege
noncompliance with Convention provisions "for the prompt release of the
vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial
security."'13 7 There is general agreement, however, that detentions of vessels for violating EEZ fishing regulations under Article 73,138 rules concerning pollution from vessels under Article 220,139 and investigations of
foreign vessels for specified pollution violations under Article 226140 fall
within the scope of Article 292. Each of these Articles specifically refers to
release of those vessels on the posting of a bond or financial security.
Numerous other Convention provisions concerning the arrest of foreign
flag vessels - e.g., for criminal activities in the territorial sea or for unauthorized broadcasting - do not refer to such a process. 14 1 Although Article 292 does not authorize a tribunal to decide the merits of the underlying
tions that could deprive captains and vessel owners of their means of livelihood. See 4
MARJORIE WHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 22, at 1102 (1965). The problem

of foreign detentions of U.S. fishing vessels continues in the 1990s. See Roach, supra
note 43, at 785 (reporting 1992 Costa Rican detentions of U.S. fishing vessels). For a
discussion of the serious consequences associated with detentions of vessels and their
crews, see Bernard H. Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 11 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 201, 203-04 (1997)
[hereinafter Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release].
134. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 292(1).
135. See id. (submitting release questions to the ITLOS is possible failing mutual
agreement on submission to another court or tribunal within 10 days of detention);
ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, art. 112 (providing maximum of 10 days from receipt of
application to fix hearing date; one day to present evidence; maximum of 10 days following close of hearing to render judgment).
136. See Ranjeva, supra note 45, at 1383.
137. Article 292 and prompt release procedures are the subject of a symposium entited "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Establishment and 'Prompt
Release' Procedures," which appears in Volume 11, No. 2 of The InternationalJournalof
Marine and Coastal Law (1996). The scope of detentions to which Article 292 applies is
also addressed in E.D. Brown, The M/V 'Saiga' Case on Prompt Release of Vessels: The
FirstJudgment of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 22 MARINE POLv 307,
311-18 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, FirstJudgment].
138. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 73(2) (specifically referring to
prompt release on the posting of reasonable bond or other security),
139. See id. art. 220(7) (referring to "appropriate procedures ... either through the
competent international organization [a reference to the International Maritime Organization] or as otherwise agreed, whereby compliance with requirements for bonding or
other appropriate financial security has been assured.")
140. See id. art. 226(1)(b) ("release shall be made promptly subject to reasonable procedures such as bonding or other appropriate financial security").
141. See David H. Anderson, Investigation, Detention and Release of Foreign Vessels
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and Other InternationalAgreements, 11 INT'LJ. MARINE & COASTAL L. 165 (1996) [hereinafter Anderson, Detention and
Release]; Brown, FirstJudgment, supra note 137, at 316-18.
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dispute or to determine damages arising from a detention, the Article does
allow some modest oversight of coastal state activities.
The ITLOS's first case, decided in December 1997, concerned a
prompt release dispute under Article 292. In the MAV Saiga Case, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines brought a claim against Guinea, arguing that
Guinea had failed to release a vessel flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines and its crew on the posting of a reasonable bond. 142 The
ITLOS, rendering its decision only three weeks after the case was filed,
ordered Guinea to release the vessel on the posting of a bond or financial
security of $400,000 in addition to the vessel's gasoil cargo. Guinea has
complied with the order.14 3 Part II.A of this Article analyzes the MAV Saiga
Case and the ITLOS's role in Article 292 cases in greater detail.
c. Provisional Measures
Any court or tribunal finding "that primafacie it has jurisdiction" under
Part XV or Part XI may prescribe provisional measures. 14 4 Article 290 of
the Law of the Sea Convention sets out other conditions related to provisional measures. A court or tribunal may prescribe a provisional measure
if "appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of
the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision." 145 A court or tribunal may revoke or
modify a provisional measure "as soon as the circumstances justifying [it]
have changed or ceased to exist."146 The parties "shall comply promptly
with any provisional measures prescribed." 14 7 It is beyond cavil that provi148
sional measures are binding.
142. M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6.
143. See ITLOS, Guinea Complies with Judgment of the Tribunal, (visited Nov. 17, 1998)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS._14.htm>. The underlying dispute
over the legality of the arrest and issues of hot pursuit and freedom of navigation are the
subject of a separate case now before the Tribunal. See ITLOS, TribunalSeized of Merits
in Case of "Bunkering" of Vessels at Sea (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS._13.htm> [hereinafter ITLOS Press 131. This pending
case gave rise to a 1998 order prescribing a provisional measure, which is noted in the
following subsection.
144. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 290(1). See also id. Annex VI, art.
25.
145. Id. The stated purpose of provisional measures under Article 290 is broader
than the stated purpose of such measures under Article 41 of the ICJ's Statute. Article
41 gives the Court the power to indicate "any provisional measures which ought to be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." As noted, Article 290 provisional
measures may be prescribed to preserve the rights of the parties "or to prevent serious
harm to the marine environment." See Rosenne, Points of Difference, supra note 97, at
206-08.
146. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 290(2).
147. Id. art. 290(6).
148. This conclusion follows from the use of the word "prescribe," see id. art. 290(1),
(3-(5), and the explicit requirement that parties "comply" with any provisional measure.
Id. art. 290(6). See also id. Annex VI, art. 25. Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, by contrast,
only authorizes the Court to "indicate" provisional measures, and the binding effect of
ICJ provisional measures has been a matter of some dispute. See JEROME B. ELuUN,
ITrmuM PROTECTION: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 153-64 (1981); Rosenne, Points of Difference, supra note 97, at 206-08.
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The Convention accords the ITLOS a significant role with respect to
provisional measures by designating it the "default" tribunal when the parties cannot agree on one court or tribunal:
Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being
submitted under [Part XV, Section 2], any court or tribunal agreed upon by
the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the
request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea or, with respect to activities in the Area, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance
with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be
constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so
requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures ....14 9
The motivation for allocating residual compulsory jurisdiction to the
ITLOS with respect to provisional measures was the same as for Article 292
cases. The negotiators at UNCLOS III feared that giving such residual
jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal, as is done in other Article 287 cases,
could cause undue delays given the time required to constitute an arbitral
tribunal.150
To date, the ITLOS has issued one order prescribing a provisional measure. Following the Tribunal's 1997 decision ordering Guinea to release
the M/V Saiga,15 1 the vessel's flag state (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
brought a new claim against Guinea related to the seizure. In this second
case, the ITLOS unanimously prescribed a provisional measure requiring
Guinea to "refrain from taking or enforcing any judicial or administrative
measure against the M/V Saiga, its Master and the other members of the
crew, its owners or operators, in connection with" the vessel's 1997 arrest
and detention and "the subsequent prosecution and conviction of the
Master."' 152 Judge Laing appended a separate opinion that set out the factors for deciding whether to prescribe a provisional measure:
[I]t
is useful to recall the discretionary and equitable nature of the institution of provisional measures. This suggests that urgency should always be
149. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 290(5). This passage suggests a
third difference - in addition to the two differences noted supra notes 145, 148 between the approach to provisional measures in the ICJ and the 1TLOS. The ITLOS,
unlike the ICJ, may issue orders for provisional measures where the merits will be
addressed before a different court or tribunal, whereas the ICJ's order would precede
consideration of the merits by the ICJ itself.
150. See Ranjeva, supra note 45, at 1381.
151. M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6. For analysis of this prompt release case, see infra
notes 176-242 and accompanying text.
152. M/V Saiga (No. 2), supra note 6. The Tribunal also unanimously recommended,
but did not prescribe,
that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Guinea endeavour to find an arrangement to be applied pending the final decision, and to this end the two States
should ensure that no action is taken by their respective authorities or vessels
flying their flag which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the
Tribunal.
The merits of the dispute that gave rise to the arrest and seizure are now before the
ITLOS. See ITLOS Press 13, supra note 143.
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borne in mind as an aspect of any possible "circumstance." But equally or
alternatively should there be borne in mind such aspects, if they exist, as (1)
the wrong has already occurred or cannot be compensated or monetarily
repaired (e.g. the continued detentions after 4 December 1997 in this case),
(2) the certainty that the feared consequence will occur unless the Tribunal
intervenes, (3) the seriousness of the threat, (4) the right being preserved
has unique or particularly special value and (5) the magnitude of the undercogens values as global
lying global public order value, e.g. such possiblyjus
53
peace and security or environmental protection.'
Judge Laing correctly emphasizes that judicial balancing of several factors
is the essence of any decision to prescribe provisional measures.
d. Advisory Opinions
The Law of the Sea Convention provides a narrow advisory role for the
ITLOS. Whereas courts of member states in the European Union can seek
advice from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on issues of Community
55
law, 15 4 and a similar proposal has been made with respect to the ICJ,the Convention does not authorize national courts to seek advice from the
ITLOS. Such a mechanism could promote uniform interpretation of the
Convention among national courts.
The ITLOS also lacks general authority to issue advisory opinions at
the request of international organizations. The ICJ, the judicial arm of the
United Nations, may render an advisory opinion on any legal question at
the request of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or (if the
request is authorized by the General Assembly) other U.N. organs and specialized agencies; in the latter case, however, opinions are limited to legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities.15 6 Because the ITLOS
is not the judicial arm of any international oceans organization with broad
57
With
powers, its lack of general advisory jurisdiction is unsurprising.'
of
the
respect to legal issues arising under Part XI, however, a chamber
advisory
rendering
including
role,
ITLOS has an important interpretive
opinions.' 5 8 Article 191 of the Convention authorizes the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to "give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or
Council [of the International Sea-Bed1 59Authority] on legal questions arising
within the scope of their activities."
153. M/V Saiga (No. 2), supra note 6, 1125 (Laing, J., separate opinion).
154. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 377, as amended [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
155. See Louis B. Sohn, Broadeningthe Advisory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt
of Justice, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 124 (1983).
156. ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 96. See Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I.CJ. 150

(June 8).
157. Cf. Draft Ocean Space Treaty, supra note 119, art. 163 (authorizing organs of the
proposed International Ocean Space Institution or its member states to request advisory
opinions from the proposed International Maritime Court).
158. See infra notes 317, 327 and accompanying text.
159. See also ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, arts. 130-37; Statement by the Chairman on
the Question of Advisory Opinions, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/1984/CRP.5 (1984), in 3
Prepcom Report, supra note 40, at 373.
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Although national courts and (except under Part XI) international
organizations may not seek advisory opinions from the ITLOS, states may,
by treaty, authorize the submission of requests for advisory opinions to the
Tribunal. 160 Thus, the ITLOS may give advisory opinions if an international agreement so provides.
e. Part XI Disputes
A chamber of the ITLOS plays a central role in Part XI's dispute settlement
provisions, which concern the regime for sea-bed mining beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. These dispute settlement provisions are in many
ways separate from the provisions of Part XV. 161 Negotiators at UNCLOS
III initially considered creating an entirely separate tribunal to address seabed mining disputes under Part XI. They ultimately settled on a distinct
judicial chamber, the eleven-member Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, within
the ITLOS. 162 The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has jurisdiction over disputes that arise out of the interpretation or application of Part XI, certain
acts of the International Sea-Bed Authority, mining exploration and
exploitation contracts, and certain activities on the deep sea bed. 163 States
Parties, the Authority, the Enterprise (the Authority's sea-bed mining arm),
state enterprises, and natural or juridical persons may appear before the
Chamber in various categories of disputes.
Part XI affords disputants some flexibility in choosing a third-party
forum by allowing tribunals other than the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to
hear cases. For example, States Parties involved in a dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of Part XI may agree to submit the dispute
to a special chamber of the ITLOS rather than to the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber.' 64 Alternatively, any party to such a dispute may submit it to a
different, three-member ad hoc chamber. 165 The parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of mining contracts may opt for
commercial arbitration. 166 Under the 1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement, disputes relating to subsidization of production, which are subject to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its codes and successor
160. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, art. 138. The Tribunal's Rules do not explicitly
authorize private parties to request an advisory opinion from the ITLOS. See supra note
129 and accompanying text. See also Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex
VIII, art. 5(3) (parties to a dispute may authorize a special arbitral tribunal to formulate
"recommendations"); 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 1 A.VI.99.
161. The provisions of Part XV, Section 1, however, which concern informal dispute
settlement procedures and general dispute settlement obligations, do apply to Part X1
disputes. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 285.
162. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, 1 A.VI.170; SINGH, supra note 33, at 59-60;
infra notes 309-26 and accompanying text.
163. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 187. The Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber was established in February 1997. See ITLOS, Judges of the Tribunal Select the
Seabed Disputes Chamber, the Chamberfor the Marine Environment and the Chamber on
Fisheries Matters (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/
iTLOS_5.htm>.
164. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 188(1)(a).
165. See id. art. 188(1)(b).
166. See id. art. 188(2).
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agreements, may be decided by WTO dispute settlement procedures. 16 7
Under Part XI, entities authorized to use the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber include States Parties to the Convention, international institutions (the
Sea-Bed Authority and the Enterprise, which is the mining arm of the
Authority), and certain natural or juridical persons. 168 Cases thus may
involve the entities that are most directly concerned with a dispute. Part
II.C of this Article will discuss some of the Chamber's functions in sea-bed
mining cases in detail.
D.

Summary

The dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention and the
ITLOS are novel and complex constructs. The above discussion suggests
that the ITLOS may play a significant role in addressing ocean-related disputes. The following Part will analyze the various functions that the ITLOS
or its chambers may carry out in hearing some disputes.
II.

The Functions of the ITLOS and the Relations of States and
Nonstate Entities

When states endow an international court with compulsory jurisdiction to
hear disputes related to the interpretation or application of binding treaty
rules, those states do not traditionally allow the court's decisions to be
enforceable against them through judicial process. Rather, states look to
the presence of the court to deter violations of existing law, to settle disputes, to define or clarify the law, or perhaps to justify proportionate countermeasures against a violating state when the dispute cannot be resolved
69
through negotiation or other informal mechanisms.'
Commentators have noted certain judicial behaviors that contribute to
the effectiveness and legitimacy of international courts.17 ° These behaviors include issuing reasoned decisions, exercising independence, deciding
cases with consistency, and, especially in a court's early years, interpreting
treaties according to generally accepted methods of treaty interpretation.
Although interstate relations will develop and adjust independent of judicial decisions, a court may nevertheless help shape the norms that influence interstate relationships.
167. If one or more States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention as modified by the
Part XI Agreement are not parties to such GATT agreements, recourse is to be had to the
dispute settlement procedures set out in the Law of the Sea Convention. See Part XI
Agreement, supra note 4, Annex, §§ 6.1(f), 6.4. For discussion of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures, see INTERNA-IONAL TRADE Lav AND THE GATT/WTO DIsPuTE
S-1LEMErr SYSTEm (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter GATT/WTO DisPuTE SErrEmENT].

168. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 187; id. Annex VI, art. 37. The
Convention contains provisions concerning the participation of sponsoring states in
cases in which natural or juridical persons are parties. See id. art. 190; supra note 113.
169. See Noyes, Compromissory Clauses, supra note 43; Noyes, Implications, supra note

14.
170. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 19; REsm.N, supra note 83; Heifer & Slaughter,
supra note 19, at 284.
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A picture of international law and process painted only in terms of
interstate relationships is incomplete. When states create an international
court or tribunal, they may affect the relationships of natural or juridical
persons. The states may provide for international judicial action that can
shape the relationships of those persons. The states may even grant natural or juridical persons direct access to the court or tribunal. 17 1
The functions of specialized international tribunals that deal with
individual claims vary considerably. For example, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 17 2 decides how to distribute money to businesses and individuals
harmed by the 1979 Iranian revolution. 173 Conceptually, those private
claimiants are no longer in a continuing relationship with Iran; the Claims
Tribunal decides damages arising from one historical episode. To that end,
the Tribunal controls a pool of money to provide compensation. By contrast, the functions of the European Court of Human Rights differ significantly.' 7 4 This Court is successful because national courts respect, and
national governments implement, its rulings. The European Court engages
in an ongoing dialogue with national courts and accords national governments a margin of appreciation in addressing issues related to individual
rights. 175
The ITLOS is a recent addition to the ranks of specialized international tribunals. Yet, the ITLOS operates within numerous different
regimes, and its intended functions appear more varied that those of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal or the European Court of Human Rights. To
evaluate the ITLOS and understand its potential relationships with different entities, one must appreciate the specific functions it is designed to
serve. Whether the Tribunal can gain legitimacy may well depend on its
ability to develop decision-making techniques suitable to its different
functions.
171. See generally David D. Caron & Galina Shinkaretskaya, Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes Through the Rule of Law, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 309 (Lori Fisler Damrosch et al. eds., 1995) (distinguishing
interstate disputes, disputes involving private transnational relationships that may be of
international concern, and human rights disputes).
172. Algiers Accords, 1 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Rep. 3 (1981-1982), 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 418 (1981).
173. For an insightful analysis of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal that places it in the
context of the evolving structure of international dispute settlement, see Caron, Claims
Tribunal, supra note 83. The Tribunal still faces unresolved interpretive claims, intergovernmental claims, and private claims. See Roger P. Alford & Peter H.F. Bekker, International Courts and Tribunals, 32 Ir'L LAw. 499, 506 (1998).
174. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
175. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 316-18. International courts, following a process of dialogue with national courts, may both respond to points made by
national courts and look to those courts to implement international rulings concerning
individuals. See Karen Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in THE EUROPEAN
COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS -

DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENcE 227 (Anne-Marie Slaugh-

ter et al. eds., 1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication,
29 U. RICH. L. REv. 99 (1994) [hereinafter Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication].
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Part II.A of this Article examines the ITLOS's first decision, an Article
292 prompt release case, in which the interests of individuals, states, and
national courts are implicated. Part II.B evaluates some of the ITLOS's
other potential roles - as a rule-applying body in a sensitive bilateral dispute, as a legislative body in a multilateral dispute, and as a court of equity
- in different types of interstate cases. Part II.C then analyzes the potential
role of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber as a constitutional court reviewing
the validity of rules promulgated by an international institution.
A. Article 292 Prompt Release Cases
When a coastal state detains a flag state's vessel and crew, the flag state or
its designee may ask the ITLOS to order their prompt release under Article
292 of the Law of the Sea Convention. The Tribunal's rulings, on an issue
that traditionally has been within the purview of national admiralty jurisdiction, implicate relationships among the ITLOS, individuals, states, and
national courts. The first decision of the ITLOS, in the M/VSaiga Case,' 76
involved an application for release under Article 292.
1.

The M/V Saiga Case

When a State Party to the Law of the Sea Convention has detained a vessel
flying the flag of another State Party, Article 292 of the Convention may
apply. An Article 292 proceeding can at most lead to an order for the
release of the detained vessel and its crew on the posting of a reasonable
bond; the decision maker does not consider the merits of the underlying
dispute or award damages. 17 7 Article 292 allows applications "by or on
behalf of' the flag state of a vessel, when the detaining state allegedly "has
not complied with the provisions of the Convention for the prompt release
of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other
financial security." 178 Article 73 explicitly addresses prompt release on
the posting of a reasonable bond. Article 73 authorizes a coastal state to
176. M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6.
177. In the MAV Saiga Case, the ITLOS emphasized the language of Article 292(3) to

the effect that prompt release proceedings shall be "without prejudice to the merits of
any case before the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew."
Thus, the Tribunal "shall deal only with the question of release." Id. 149. The Tribunal
also concluded that,
while the States which are parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal are
bound by the judgment adopted by it as far as the release of the vessel and the
bond or other security are concerned, their domestic courts, in considering the
merits of the case, are not bound by any findings of fact or law that the Tribunal
may have made in order to reach its conclusions.

Id.
178. In such actions, the ITLOS has compulsory jurisdiction unless the parties agree
on an alternative forum. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text; infra note 230
and accompanying text. A prompt release case could also be pursued as a normal Part
XV case under Article 288, although the speedy action contemplated under Article 292
may not be obtainable under Article 288. Actions for provisional measures may also be
pursued in such cases, although the Article 292 procedure may be speedier and is more
closely tailored to the issue of release. See Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release, supra
note 133, at 207-10. Applications for the prompt release of vessels and crews have prior-
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arrest vessels to ensure compliance with its fishing laws in its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), but includes the proviso that "[a]rrested vessels and
their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond
or other security." 179 Article 73 also explicitly precludes a coastal state
from imposing imprisonment or corporal punishment for violations of
fisheries laws in its EEZ. 180 The M/V Saiga Case involved both Article 292
and Article 73.
On October 28, 1997, Guinean customs patrol boats arrested the MIV
Saiga, a vessel flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The M/
V Saiga entered Guinea's EEZ to bunker, i.e., supply fuel oil, to fishing vessels "in all likelihood . . . within the contiguous zone of Guinea." 18 1
Guinea arrested the M/V Saiga for this activity, claiming that it was smuggling fuel in violation of Guinea's customs laws.' 8 2 Guinea did not request
a bond or other security when it detained the vessel, its captain, and the

crew. 183
On November 13, 1997, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines instituted
proceedings in the ITLOS against Guinea, filing an application with the
ITLOS under Article 292 and claiming that Guinea failed to comply with
Article 73's requirements of prompt release and nonimprisonment. 184 The
ITLOS promptly held hearings and, on December 4, 1997, rendered its
decision.
The ITLOS unanimously found that it had jurisdiction under Article
292, and the judges all agreed that some of the prerequisites in Article
292(1) were satisfied. In particular, a vessel of one State Party to the Convention (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) was detained by another State
Party (Guinea), and the two states had not agreed on a forum different
from the ITLOS within ten days after the arrest. The ITLOS was split, howity even over proceedings for provisional measures. See ITLOS Rules, supranote 44, arts.
90(1), 112.
179. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 73(2). For discussion of other
provisions of the Convention that explicitly address release on the posting of a bond or
other financial security, see supra notes 132, 137-40 and accompanying text.
180. Id. art. 73(3).
181. MIV Saiga Case, supra note 6, c 61. According to Guinea's evidence, three vessels received fuel; two were Italian and one was Greek. See id. 1 7 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
182. See Letter from the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Guinea to the President
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Nov. 25, 1997, at 3, 6 (on file with
author). The arrest occurred outside Guinea's EEZ following pursuit by Guinean patrol
boats. See M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, 1 30.
183. See M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, 11 30, 33.
184. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines may have regarded diplomatic protests as
likely to be unavailing because it believed the arrest of the MIV Saiga was "part of a
wider pattern of international piracy" in which Guinea was "actively engaged." The M/
V Saiga, Memorial of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Nov. 11, 1997, at 8 (on file with
author). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines cited eight previous attacks on tankers by
Guinean authorities. Id. Accord Request of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for the

Prescription of Provisional Measures Pursuant to Article 290(5) of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Jan. 5, 1998, at 7.
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ever, over the admissibility of the application for release, 185 because of disagreement concerning whether the application met Article 292(1)'s
requirement that the flag state allege noncompliance with Convention provisions for "prompt release... upon the posting of a reasonable bond or
other financial security." By a vote of twelve to nine, 18 6 the ITLOS found
the application of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines admissible and
ordered Guinea to promptly release the MiV Saiga and its crew from detention. It also decided, by the same vote, that the release was conditional on
the posting of a reasonable bond or security, and that the security consisted of the M/V Saiga's full load of gasoil (valued at approximately
$1,000,000) plus an additional $400,000.187
The majority and the dissenting judges disagreed about the applicant's
burden, or standard of proof, in Article 292 proceedings. The majority
noted that "a case concerning the merits of the situation that led to the
arrest of the MiV Saiga could later be submitted for a decision on the merits to the ITLOS or to another court or tribunal competent according to
article 287," a point consistent with the text of Article 292.18 The majority went on to indicate, however, that this circumstance required the ITLOS
189
to consider "with restraint" the merits of the release:
The possibility that the merits of the case may be submitted to an international court or tribunal, and the accelerated nature of the prompt release
proceedings.... are not without consequence, as regards the standard of
appreciation by the Tribunal of the allegations of the parties. The Tribunal
in this regard considers appropriate an approach based on assessing
whether the allegations made are arguable or are of a sufficiently plausible

characterin the sense that the Tribunal may rely upon them for the present
purposes. By applying such a standard the Tribunal does not foreclose that

if a case were presented to it requiring
190 full examination of the merits it
would reach a different conclusion.
This reliance on an "arguable or sufficiently plausible" standard suggests
that the majority viewed Article 292 orders as akin to provisional
185. Whether an application is admissible depends on "whether it falls within the
scope of the [non-jurisdiction] requirements of article 292." M/V Saiga Case, supra note
6, 1 46. If an application is deemed admissible, the Tribunal must also determine
whether the applicant's allegations are "well founded." Id. 1 79; see ITLOS Rules, supra
note 44, art. 113(1)-(2). For a critical view of the Tribunal's use of the concept of admissibility, see Brown, FirstJudgment, supra note 137, at 319-20.

186. Four dissenting opinions were filed, one by President Mensah, one by Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto, one by Judge Anderson, and one by Judges Park,
Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas, and Ndiaye.
187. The $400,000 was "to be posted in the form of a letter of credit or bank guarantee or, if agreed by the parties, in any other form." M/V SaigaCase, supra note 6, cl 5; see
id. 135, 84-85. Differences between the parties over the bond were eventually resolved,
and the MV Saiga and its master and crew were released in accordance with the December 1997 judgment. See Rosenne, 1996-97 Survey, supra note 44, at 514.
188. M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, c 50. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2,
art. 292(3). Accord MV Saiga Case, supranote 6, 1 6 (Vice-President Wolfrum & Yamamoto, J., dissenting). Such a case, arising out of the same fact situation, has indeed been
filed and is pending before the Tribunal. See ITLOS Press 13, supra note 143.
189. MV Saiga Case, supra note 6, cl50.
190. Id. cI51 (emphasis added).
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measures.
The dissenting judges disagreed. According to Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto, Article 292 sets a "definite" and not a "preliminary or incidental" procedure. "[T]o develop a 'standard of appreciation'
on the basis that later a decision might be taken on the legality of
the ... arrest blurs the differences between the procedure of article 292
1 92
and other procedures under Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention."'
The dissenters held that Article 292 cases are not merely preliminary to
other proceedings, and the applicant should present more than "sufficiently plausible" allegations:
[W]e do not consider that a mere allegation that the detaining state has not
complied with the provisions of article 73 of the Convention will satisfy the
condition for the application of article 292 of the Convention. There must
be a genuine connection between the detention of the vessel and its crew and
the laws and regulations of the detaining state relating to article 73. The
burden to establish such a connection is upon the Applicant. Without such
a connection, the Tribunal must conclude that the allegation 193
that the detaining state has failed to comply with article 73 is unfounded.
The disagreement over the appropriate standard of proof helps explain
the disagreement between the majority and dissent concerning the admissibility of the prompt release application. According to the majority, Guinea
based its arrest on Article 40 of its Maritime Code and Law, which relates
in part to sovereign rights over fisheries, and on another national law
prohibiting unauthorized import, transport, and distribution of fuel in the
country. 19 4 The majority believed the dispute could be characterized in
different ways. Bunkering fishing vessels could be "assimilated to the regulation of the exercise by the coastal State of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone. It can be argued that refueling is by nature an activity ancillary to that of the refueled ship." 195 This characterization was helpful to
the applicants because it provided a link to Article 73 and that Article's
explicit requirement that arrested vessels and crews be promptly released.
On the other hand, bunkering could be classified either as a customs viola191. In cases involving provisional measures, "the benefit of the doubt goes to the
applicant state," according to "wide practice of international courts and tribunals."
Rosenne, 1996-97 Survey, supra note 44, at 513-14. For discussion of the Tribunal's
standard of proof in Article 292 cases, see Lauterpacht, supra note 96, at 403-09.
192. M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, '1 6 (Vice-President Wolfrum & Yamamoto, J.,
dissenting).
193. Id. [4. The dissenters construed the text of Article 292, which uses the term
"decision," and Article 113(1) of the Rules of the Tribunal, which requires the Tribunal
to "determine" that an allegation "is well-founded," to support their position. See id. 8;
id. c 5, 7 (President Mensah, dissenting); id. 5 (Anderson, J., dissenting); id. 1 8
(Park, J., dissenting). The dissenters also thought that the majority's decision on the
burden an applicant must meet had adverse implications for the balance of coastal state
powers in the EEZ; these concerns are discussed infra notes 220-27 and accompanying

text.
194. See M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, 1 63.
195. Id. c 57.

1998

InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea

tion or as an exercise of freedom of navigation. 19 6 These latter characterizations provided no link to Article 73.
The majority's view of the appropriate "standard of appreciation" obviated the need to decide which characterization was the most accurate. To
determine the admissibility of the application for prompt release, "it is sufficient to note that non-compliance with article 73, paragraph 2, of the
Convention has been 'alleged' and to conclude that the allegation is arguable or sufficiently plausible."'19 7 In determining whether the allegation of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was well-founded, the ITLOS also noted
it was not bound by Guinea's classification of the dispute as one involving
customs issues. Instead, a characterization connecting Guinea's arrest to
Article 73 was preferable because a customs characterization made it "very
arguable that... the Guinean authorities acted from the beginning in violation of international law." 198 Guinea's pursuit of the M/V Saiga might not
be legally justifiable as "hot pursuit" under Article 111 of the Law of the
Sea Convention if the seizure had been for a customs violation. 19 9 For
these reasons, the ITLOS determined that the allegation of Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines was well-founded and thus ordered the release of the
200
vessel and its crew.
The dissenting judges, on the other hand, found it plausible that
Guinea's seizure and detention of the M/V Saiga had been for customs violations, and that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines thus had not demonstrated that their application was well-founded. The dissenters disagreed
with the majority's reliance on Article 40 of Guinea's Maritime Code and
Law, which the majority cited to support its conclusion that Guinea's
action was fisheries-related. In the words of one dissenting judge, Article
40 merely "establishes and provides for the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) of Guinea in standard terms drawn from Article 56 of the [Law of
the Sea] Convention, terms which do not appear on their face to create any
criminal offenses." 20 1 The dissenters noted that all the other applicable
196. See id. c 58, 60.

197. Id. cl 59.
198. Id. l 72.
199. See id. JcJ 61, 70. According to the Law of the Sea Convention, hot pursuit of a
foreign flag ship is permitted "when the competent authorities of the coastal State have
good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State."
Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 2, art. 111(1). However, with respect to customs
violations, the Convention seemingly requires such pursuit to be commenced "when the
foreign ship ... is within the internal waters,... the territorial sea or the contiguous
zone of the pursuing State ....
" Id. The pending case on the merits may address the

legality of hot pursuit for customs violations when the foreign ship was in the coastal
state's 200-mile EEZ but not within its 24-mile contiguous zone when the pursuit began.

See ITLOS Press 13, supra note 143.
200. Because the Tribunal found a sufficient nexus between Articles 73 and 292, it

did not reach an alternative argument, based on a "non-restrictive interpretation" of Article 292, which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines argued to support the admissibility of
its application. See M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, 1173. This non-restrictive interpretation is discussed infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
201. M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, 9 6 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Article 56 sets out
in general terms the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal state in its EEZ.
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laws relied on by Guinea related to customs offenses. 20 2 Illegally supplying oil to vessels in Guinean
waters was a type of smuggling that violated
20 3
Guinea's customs laws.

Because the dissenting judges were not convinced by the majority's
attempt to link Guinea's seizure of the M/V Saiga to fisheries violations
under Article 73, the dissenters believed that an essential requirement for
an order of prompt release had not been established. They felt that the
requisite connection between Article 292 and a Convention article explicitly providing for prompt release on the posting of a reasonable bond was
lacking. As President Mensah argued in his dissent, "no action taken by
any official or authority in Guinea, before and after the arrest of the M/V
Saiga, has had the faintest link with fisheries." 20 4 Moreover, there was no
evidence that Guinean officials acted in bad faith or that Guinea's "customs
violation" explanation was patently inconsistent with the facts. Absent
such evidence, the ITLOS should not conclude "that the ostensible reasons
given [i.e., that the seizure was for a customs violation] were not in fact the
real reasons for" the seizure and detention. 20 5 For the applicant's claim to
be admissible and for the Tribunal to order prompt release, the applicant
must establish a detention following an arrest as specified in Article 73.
Given the plausibility of Guinea's argument concerning customs violations,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines could not establish such a detention. As
a result, questions concerning the release of the M/V Saiga and its crew,
along with all other aspects of the customs case, should be decided wholly
by the national courts of Guinea.
2. Analysis: The ITLOS, Individuals, States, and National Courts
Article 292 cases place the ITLOS in a web of relationships involving individuals, states, and national courts. In construing and applying Article
292, the ITLOS must balance the rights and interests of all these entities.
The following section discusses the ITLOS's relationship with these
entities.
The Law of the Sea Convention reinforces individual liberty and due
process rights in its prompt release provisions. 20 6 When a coastal state
exercises enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction over foreign ships for
violating its EEZ fisheries or pollution regulations, the Convention requires
202. See id.; id. 1 14 (Park, J., dissenting). Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto argued that fisheries-related laws would relate to issues listed in Article 62(4) of
the Law of the Sea Convention; bunkering is not one of the issues listed. See id. 1 22
(Vice-President Wolfrum & Yamamoto, J.,
dissenting).
203. According to Guinea, revenue from petroleum products constitutes as much as
37% of its national revenue. See id. I 10, 16 (Park, J., dissenting).
204. Id. 1 16 (President Mensah, dissenting).
205. Id. 18. Although the applicant contended that bunkering by the M/V Saiga
"could come within Article 40 of Guinean law" - if, for example, Guinea was engaged in
an anti-bunkering operation to protect fish stocks in its EEZ (by denying fishing vessels
an easy refueling option) - no evidence supported such a theory. Id. 12 (Park, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added); see id. 11 13-14. See also id. 1 10 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (concluding the MV Saiga was not an "arrested vessel" under Article 73(2)).
206. See Oxman, Human Rights, supra note 80, at 423.
1
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the coastal state to release the arrested vessel and crew on the.posting of a
reasonable bond or other financial security. The Convention also prohibits
imprisonment, corporal punishment, and other non-monetary penalties.20 7 These individual rights are rights vis-A-vis a state. Because they
relate to procedural due process and liberty interests, they are conceptually
within the core of "first generation" civil and political rights (as opposed to
economic, social, and cultural rights, or collective rights) recognized by
208
international law.
The scope of the specified rights is limited. Foreign flag vessels and
their crews may benefit from Article 292; a coastal state's own vessels do
not have similar rights. 20 9 Furthermore, although a flag state may raise
these prompt release guhrantees before the ITLOS or other tribunals,
detained individuals have no assured access to courts. During the
UNCLOS III negotiations, some delegations favored giving individuals
access to the ITLOS in prompt release cases. For example, the United
States advocated allowing "[t]he owner or operator of any vessel detained
by any state" to "bring the question of the detention of the vessel before the
[Law of the Sea] Tribunal in order to secure its prompt release. '2 10 According to the compromise language of Article 292, however, "[t]he application
for release may be made only by or on behalf of the flag State of the vessel."'2 11 The italicized language would be redundant if one were to inter-

pret this provision as prohibiting an individual from bringing a prompt
release claim.2 1 2 Yet a "state filter" remains. To initiate an Article 292
prompt release application, either the flag state must bring it or the flag
207. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 73(2)-(4), 226(1)(b), 230(1)(2), 231; Oxman, Human Rights, supra note 80, at 422-24. The Convention includes

various additional safeguards with respect to pollution violations. For example, a state
exercising its pollution jurisdiction cannot discriminate against vessels of other states,
see Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 227, and has only a limited time to
prosecute violations by foreign flag vessels. See id. art. 228. Article 230 specifically
requires observance of "recognized rights of the accused" in proceedings concerning
pollution violations "committed by a foreign vessel which may result in the imposition
of penalties." For discussion of Article 230, see Oxman, Human Rights, supra note 80, at
425-27.
208. See Ric-ARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 194-98,
201 (3d ed. 1995). It is also arguable that prolonged detention of a vessel and its cargo
may be so economically devastating to a ship owner and to cargo interests that it effectively amounts to a taking of property by the state. Cf. 5 CommNArraY, supra note 10, C
292.4.
209. A flag state could raise the Convention rights of a coastal state's citizens only if
the citizens happened to be adversely affected as members of the crew of a detained
vessel.
210. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/97, supra note 120, art. 8(2). See supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
211. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 292(2) (emphasis added). The
dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention were negotiated over 20
years ago, and the influence of socialist states, which took the attitude that private parties should not appear in proceedings involving states, is evident in these restrictive
provisions. See 5 CoMMENTARY, supra note 10, 'H 291.5, 292.4.
212. See Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release, supra note 133, at 211-13.
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state must designate the vessel captain, the vessel owner, a shipping association, or some other entity to do so.
The lack of assured individual access casts doubt on whether violations of individual rights are likely to be litigated. If vessel owners had the
right to proceed directly against coastal states for prompt release violations, their decision to initiate the action would depend on how they estimate the financial interests at stake, the probability of a successful
outcome, and the impact of litigation on their own relationship with the
coastal state. 2 13 If states are the only entities that can bring prompt release
applications, fewer applications would likely be filed. Many states will
choose not to pursue disputes on behalf of private interests, either diplomatically or in litigation before the ITLOS. A state's foreign affairs office
may prefer that vessel owners or captains pursue their own claims in the
coastal state's courts or that they appeal to the coastal state's government
officials. 2 14 States are often reluctant to bring claims against other states,
even if they are meritorious or implicate important "state interests," for fear
of upsetting friendly relations or disrupting negotiations on other matters. 2 15 Such concerns may likewise deter states from approving individual access in prompt release cases.
The ITLOS itself can take steps to focus on individual rights in prompt
release situations. The ITLOS's orders of prompt release will implicitly recognize the individual rights at stake. 2 16 The ITLOS's "arguable or sufficiently plausible" standard for assessing Article 292 prompt release
claims 2 17 sets a low threshold for the issuance of prompt release orders in
future cases.2 1 8 The ITLOS's speedy decision in the M/V Saiga Case
should also encourage claimants to pursue prompt release applications.
Lastly, the ITLOS could liberally construe the prerequisites concerning
state authorization of private claims. The ITLOS's current Rules appear to
recognize that states may grant blanket authorizations to captains or owners of vessels to bring Article 292 prompt release applications and do not
require a flag state to grant a specific authorization with respect to each
213. See Caron, Claims Tribunal, supra note 83, at 154-55.
214. Certainly, the fact that the rights appear in the Convention is in itself significant;
many states will give effect to these obligations without international litigation. See also
Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 2, art. 232 (requiring access to national tribunals
for actions against states for damage or loss attributable to unlawful or unreasonable
enforcement measures taken in pollution cases).
215. See Hans von Mangoldt, Arbitration and ConciliationTreaties, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTER'AnoNAL LAw 230, 232-33 (1992); Wirth, supra note 1, at 779.
216. Although the Tribunal did not engage in broadly worded "rights talk" in the first
MIV Saiga Case,Judge Laing's separate opinion in the Tribunal's second case - involving a claim for provisional measures arising out of the seizure of the M/V Saiga - does
explicitly recognize that the Convention embodies human rights claims. See M/V Saiga
(No. 2), supra note 6, 21 (Laing, J., separate opinion).
217. See supra text accompanying note 190.
218. Some judges have suggested they might accept an even broader interpretation of

Article 292's prerequisites for prompt release allegations. This "non-restrictive interpretation" would not be limited to situations, such as Article 73 fishing violations, linked to
the Convention articles that specifically refer to the posting of a reasonable bond or
other financial security. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
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detention. 219 These steps may increase the number of prompt release
applications and, incidentally, the attention given to individual rights.
Overall, however, the Convention limits the ability of individuals and
corporations to pursue prompt release proceedings against coastal states in
the ITLOS. Restricting the access of private entities to the Tribunal
deprives them of opportunities to seek judicial clarification of their rights
and to pursue remedies when their rights have been infringed.
Yet, prompt release cases are not simply about the rights of vessel owners and crew members. These cases also implicate geopolitical questions
involving the balance of coastal and non-coastal state rights and obligations in the EEZ. The Law of the Sea Convention reflects delicate compromises on substantive provisions relating to fisheries activities in the
EEZ and on the scope of third-party jurisdiction with respect to disputes
concerning those activities. The Convention accords coastal states significant authority to regulate many economic activities in the EEZ. With
respect to third-party settlement of EEZ disputes, Article 292, the prompt
release provision, provides a narrow exception to Article 297, which limits
the applicability of the Convention's mechanisms for binding third-party
dispute settlement in EEZ fishing disputes. 2 20 Article 292 was one product
of the compromise at UNCLOS III concerning coastal state powers in the
EEZ.
Certain aspects of the M/V Saiga Case raise troublesome questions
about the ITLOS's role in maintaining the Convention's balance of coastal
and noncoastal state rights in the EEZ. As Vice-President Wolfrum and
Judge Yamamoto said in their dissent, "[tihe 'prima facie test' adopted by
the Judgment for deciding whether an allegation made by a flag state is
inadequate.., under Article 292 ...would radically upset that balance in
favour of flag states. '22 1 One dissenter also criticized the decision for limiting the coastal state's ability to prosecute customs and smuggling violations. According to Judge Anderson, the Convention leaves such issues
largely to the discretion of coastal states. Enlarging the scope of the
ITLOS's jurisdiction could be dangerous:
[T]he Convention... does not confine permissible penalties in respect of
smuggling offences to fines and confiscation orders (as, generally, in the
case of fisheries offences in Article 73) or to monetary penalties.. .; imprisonment remains available in regard to smuggling offences. Prompt release
orders reduce the penalties available to the appropriate domestic forum and
may even prejudice the holding of the trial in the first place. Part XV of the
Convention is available to the flag state party in the event of any abusive use
by a coastal state party of its powers of arrest and prosecution, whether on
smuggling or any other criminal charges.... Article 292 is not the appropri219. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, art. 110(2)-(3). See also Oxman, Human Rights,
supra note 80, at 423.
220. See M/VSaiga Case, supra note 6, 118 (Vice-President Wolfrum & Yamamoto, J.,
dissenting). See also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
221. Id. 1 9.
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2 22
ate remedy in such cases.

In sum, aspects of the ITLOS's opinion in the M/V Saiga Case arguably
modify the negotiated balance in the Convention concerning the EEZ and
dispute settlement. By requiring the applicant to satisfy only an "arguable
or sufficiently plausible" burden, the majority threatens to tilt this balance
against coastal states.
Future prompt release cases will likely test whether the Tribunal is
willing to tilt the balance even more sharply toward flag states by broadly
construing Article 292. In particular, future cases may well consider Article 292's requirement that a flag state must allege "that the detaining State
has not complied with the provisions of th[e] Convention for ... prompt
release.., upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security."2 2 3 At least one ITLOS judge finds plausible a "non-restrictive interpretation" of Article 292. Tullio Treves, writing prior to the creation of ITLOS
and before he became a judge, found it "absurd... that the prompt release
procedure should be available in cases in which detention is permitted by
the Convention, such as those of Articles 73, 220, and 226, and not available in cases in which it is not permitted" by the Convention. 2 24 According to this interpretation, Article 292 could apply when a vessel is arrested
in violation of international law and is then detained, even if the rule
prohibiting the arrest does not specifically provide for prompt release on
the posting of a bond or other financial security.
In fact, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines argued this "non-restrictive
interpretation" of Article 292 in the MiVSaiga Case.2 25 The ITLOS did not
take a position on the non-restrictive interpretation, concluding instead
226
that the applicant's allegations based on Article 73 were well-founded.
The majority's mere mention of the non-restrictive position, however,
prompted some of the dissenters to stress the importance of rejecting such
227
an interpretation and adhering closely to the text of the Convention.
222. Id. c113 (Anderson, J., dissenting). See also id. 1 18 (Vice-President Wolfrum &
Yamamoto, J., dissenting).
223. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 292(1).
224. Tullio Treves, The Proceedings Concerning Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews
before the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 11 INT'LJ. MARINE & COASTAL L.
179, 186 (1996). He cites Convention Article 28(2), which prohibits coastal state
arrests of foreign ships passing through the territorial sea for purposes of civil proceedings, and Article 97(3), which prohibits the arrest or detention of foreign ships in matters of collision or incidents on the high seas. Id.
225. According to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guinea had violated Article
56(2) of the Convention, and this alleged violation provided a basis for finding the application admissible and for finding that an order to release the vessel and crew was wellfounded. See M/V Saiga Case, supranote 6, c 53. Article 56(2) requires the coastal state
to "have due regard to the rights and duties of other states and ... act in a manner
compatible with the provisions of this Convention" when exercising rights and performing duties in its EEZ. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 56(2).
226. See M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, c 73.
227. Judges Park, Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas, and Ndiaye noted both the
text and legislative history of Article 292 in arguing against a non-restrictive
interpretation:
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Adoption of the non-restrictive position would favor flag state interests over
those of coastal states in a manner not contemplated at UNCLOS III.
Article 292 cases also involve the relationship between the ITLOS and
national courts. To what extent will the ITLOS defer to a national court in
a prompt release case? The Law of the Sea Convention requires a party
pursuing a claim involving the interpretation or application of the Convention first to exhaust local remedies "where this is required by international
law." 22 8 But the preference for states to address their own "internal"
problems in their own courts before "elevating" the dispute to an interstate
confrontation 22 9 does not apply with respect to Article 292 prompt release
cases. The Law of the Sea Convention explicitly authorizes the submission
of prompt release applications to the ITLOS when a coastal state fails to
release the vessel or its crew on the posting of a reasonable bond, and when
the parties do not agree on another court or tribunal to hear the question
of release within "10 days from the time of detention." 2 30 Article 292 does
not preempt national courts from ruling on the underlying merits of the
dispute and subsequent arrest. 23 1 The negotiators at UNCLOS III understood that the exhaustion of local remedies rule "was not likely to apply in
cases relating to the prompt release of vessels," 2 32 and the judges did not
A textual analysis of article 292... dearly establishes that it applies only where
the Convention contains specific provisions concerning the prompt release of
the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial
security. If article 292 was also intended to cover other cases of ship arrests, it
would have been phrased differently... In a statement made in the Preparatory Commission by the Secretariat in 1985, as a result of its examination of the
legislative history of article 292, this text was interpreted as meaning that "where
a ship or vessel has been detained for violation of coastal state regulations, such
as fisheries or marine pollution, and if the substantive provisions of the Convention provides for its release upon the posting of a bond or financial security,
then access could be had to an international court or tribunal if the release
could not be obtained promptly. Relevant substantive provisions are to be
found, for instance, in Articles 73, 220 and 226."
M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, 1123 (Park, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 Prepcom Report,
supra note 40, at 390) (emphasis in original). Accord id. 'I 24-25; id. 16 (Vice-President Wolfrum & Yamamoto, J., dissenting); 5 COMMETARY, supra note 10, c 292.5.
228. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 295; see 5 COMMENTARY, supra note
10, 295.6.
229. For discussion of the rule's doctrinal contours and theoretical justifications, see
C.F. AMERASINGHE, LocAL REmmms IN INTEMRATIONAL LAW 45-366 (1990); Matthew H.

Adler, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule After the International Court of Justice's
Decision in ELSI, 39 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 641 (1990).
230. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 292(1). If the parties fail to agree
on a court or tribunal with 10 days of a detention, a prompt release application may also
be submitted to "a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under Article 287"
or to some mutually agreed-upon forum, instead of to the ITLOS. Id. See also supra note
178.
231. The Convention also does not preempt altogether the authority of national
courts even as to release questions. According to Article 292(3), "[t]he authorities of the
detaining state remain competent to release the vessel or its crew at any time." Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 292(3).
232. 5 CoMMENTARY, supra note 10, c 295.7. Accord Chairman'sSummary of Discussions: Addendum, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/L.10/Add.1 (1989), in 3 Prepcom Report,
supra note 40, at 152, I 27-31 [hereinafter 1989 Prepcom Summary]. See also 5 CoM-
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mention the rule in the M/V Saiga prompt release decision. 233
A more difficult question in prompt release cases, bearing on the relationship of the ITLOS to national courts, concerns the conditions for
release. In particular, if a national court determines that a specific bond or
security is "reasonable," on what basis should the ITLOS overturn that
determination? The Convention authorizes the ITLOS to exercise
independent judgment on the question but does not specify the standards
of "reasonableness." 23 4 In exercising its judgment, the ITLOS has a strong
incentive to accord national courts a broad "margin of appreciation" in
determining the reasonableness of a bond. 235 If the ITLOS wishes to build
support for its decisions, when reviewing a national court's determination
on the reasonableness of the bond, 23 6 the ITLOS should proceed cautiously, respecting national rulings that are not out of harmony with the
23 7
practice of other states.
If the courts and executive agencies of detaining States Parties regard
the ITLOS's rulings as well-reasoned and believe that the ITLOS has considered the viewpoints expressed in national court rulings, then those courts
and agencies are more likely to carry out their Convention obligation to
respect Article 292 prompt release decisions. 238 Similarly, when a party
MENTARY, supra note 10, cl 292.7; Anderson, Detention and Release, supra note 141, at

170, 177.
233. The scope of the local remedies rule is likely to be debated in other cases before
the ITLOS. Indeed, the rule will likely be an issue in the merits stage of the case brought
by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines against Guinea arising out of the same facts as in

the first M/V Saiga Case. In that case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines alleges that
Guinea's arrest of its flag vessel, which was bunkering fishing vessels in Guinea's EEZ,
interfered with navigational freedoms. See ITLOS Press 13, supra note 143. Arguments
that local remedies have not been exhausted "generally entail complex issues," according
to one of the Tribunal's judges, and Guinea's invocation of the rule could not be decided
"at the stage of provisional measures, which are required to be expeditious and procedurally urgent." M/V Saiga No. 2, supra note 6, '1 9 (Laing, J., separate opinion).
234. In the first M/V Saiga Case, the Tribunal did not specify the factors or reasons
that led it to conclude that the financial security it required was "reasonable." For discussion at Prepcom concerning the ITLOS's draft rules on Article 292 and the "reasonable bond" requirement, see Chairman'sSummary of Discussions, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/
SCN.4/L.10 (1988), in 3 Prepcom Report, supra note 40, at 140, all 37-75; 1989 Prepcom
Summary, supra note 232; 1987 Prepcom Summary, supra note 129, at 113-15.
235. The concept of "margin of appreciation" has been extensively developed in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. SeeJ.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOP.
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw. BYTHE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 136-59 (2d ed.
1993); HOwARD CHARLES YouRow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).

236. The legal questions likely to arise most frequently [in Article 292 prompt
release cases] concern the amount of the bond or other financial security that
must be posted and, at least on occasion, whether more time is reasonably
required for investigation prior to release. Particular cases may pose the question of whether release of a ship has been properly refused or made conditional
on proceeding to a repair yard because the ship is not seaworthy or poses an
unreasonable threat.
Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release, supra note 133, at 214.
237. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 316-17.
238. According to Article 292(4) of the Convention, when the bond or other financial
security determined by the ITLOS (or another international tribunal) is posted, "the
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seeking the release of a vessel or its crew brings proceedings before the
national court of the detaining state instead of the ITLOS, the national
court will be more likely to rely on the ITLOS's decisions in previous cases
if the court regards such decisions as legitimate. 23 9 But deference by
national courts is by no means automatic. 240 National courts are more
likely to endorse international judicial decisions concerning the scope of
treaty provisions vis-A-vis the rights of natural or juridical persons when
courts have engaged in a "judicial dialogue"
national and international
241
about the issue.
David Anderson, now a judge of the ITLOS, has suggested that Article
292 helps to fulfill the "need for an International Court of Pie Powder in
the maritime sector."242 He was referring to courts at medieval fairs that
expeditiously decided disputes, often involving minor property matters,
among traveling merchants. Although the ITLOS renders speedy decisions,
the analogy to the "court of pie powder" is imperfect for several reasons.
First, individuals - vessel owners or captains - lack assured access to the
ITLOS in Article 292 prompt release cases. Their access deperds on state
authorization. States, however, may not grant such access and may themselves refuse to pursue prompt release claims for political reasons. Second,
Article 292 only authorizes the ITLOS to order release and to determine a
reasonable bond - not to rule on the underlying dispute. The ITLOS cannot determine damages or the legality of the underlying arrest and detention. Third, despite the limited scope of the ITLOS's authority in prompt
release cases, the rights of individuals at issue in such cases, and the implications of Article 292 decisions for the balance of coastal and flag state
activities in the EEZ, are not trivial "pie powder" issues.
In sum, in Article 292 proceedings, the ITLOS needs to balance the
interests of individuals, states, and national courts. In some respects, this
balance is a zero-sum game. Actions that favor one class of entities may
authorities of the detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision of the court or
tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew."
239. On the concept of legitmacy, see supra note 170 and accompanying text; infra
notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
240. Some states ratifying the Convention have enacted legislation to insure that their
responsibilities under Article 292(4) will be carried out by their domestic courts. See,
e.g., Scott Davidson, New Zealand-United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Act
1996, 12 INr'LJ. MAINE & CoAsrAL. L. 404, 407-08 (1997). This legislation may make
enforcement of an ITLOS prompt release decision conditional; for example, if national

judicial proceedings involving the vessel or crew in question affect the rights of third
parties not named in an ITLOS decision, the ITLOS decision may not be given effect. See
id. at 407. Article 292(3) provides that the decision of the international tribunal shall be

"without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum
against the vessel, its owner or its crew." Thus, the ITLOS itself should take into account
the interests of third parties not before it in evaluating any application for release. See id.
at 408.
241. See Alter, supra note 175; Slaughter, Transjudicial Communication, supra note
175.
242. D.H. Anderson, Legal Implications of the Entry Into Force of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 44 INTr'L & Comp. L.Q. 313, 325 (1995) (citing Cecil J.B. Hurst,
Wanted) An International Court of Pie Powder, 4 Bmr. Y.B. INT'L L. 61 (1925)).
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adversely affect the interests of others. For example, by adopting an "arguable or sufficiently plausible" burden for applicants in prompt release cases,
the ITLOS may help to make itself an attractive forum for the flag states
whose vessels or crews have been detained. Yet this burden may tilt the
balance struck in the Law of the Sea Convention between coastal and flag
state rights in the EEZ against the interests of coastal states. And should
the ITLOS adopt a "non-restrictive interpretation" of Article 292 in a future
case, this balance - an important principle guiding interstate relations will be further skewed.
Prompt release cases also require the ITLOS to consider the interests
of national courts and admiralty authorities. Developing a margin of
appreciation for the work of national courts on release questions, adhering
closely to the text of the Law of the Sea Convention, and confining its
asserted competence to the release question will help this new international court to gain the respect of national courts and other components of
states.
B. Interstate Cases
Interstate cases remain at the core of the ITLOS's jurisdiction. Although
Article 292 prompt release cases may be interstate cases, they are in many
ways sui generis. Article 292 proceedings differ from traditional interstate
cases because they may involve claims by individuals, because they directly
involve individual rights, and because the ITLOS lacks competence to rule
on the underlying dispute that gave rise to the arrest and detention.
In light of the political disincentives for one state to sue another 24 3
and the availability of other fora, 24 4 it is questionable whether the ITLOS
will hear many interstate cases. Nevertheless, the ITLOS may in time establish itself as a plausible alternative to the ICJ and other fora. The ITLOS,
unlike many other "specialized" international courts, may perform a great
variety of functions, and states may come to value the Tribunal's contributions in at least some types of cases. The following discussion examines
some of the functions that the ITLOS could exercise in different types of
interstate cases.
1. The ITLOS as Rule Interpreter in Politicized Disputes?

The ITLOS may interpret and reaffirm rules in highly sensitive disputes
related to navigation rights, fishing on the high seas, and environmental
degradation. A government may use an international court as a public
forum to air its grievances against another government. The ICJ has seen
its share of "public forum" cases. 24 5 Should such cases be litigated in the
243. See supra notes 49, 215 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
245. Such cases have been brought, for example, to condemn hostage taking, see
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of May 24); nuclear testing, see Nuclear Tests Case (Ausfl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ.
253 (Dec. 20), and Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. France), 1974 I.CJ. 457 (Dec. 20);
apartheid policies, see South West Africa Case (Eth. v. S. Mr.), 1966 I.CJ. 4 (July 18),
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ITLOS under Article 290 (on provisional measures) or pursuant to a predispute mutual declaration, 24 6 the ITLOS, like the ICJ, will probably find
itself faced with nonappearing respondent states and states that ignore

adverse judgments.

24 7

How should the ITLOS handle sensitive interstate disputes? Suppose,
for example, that a state has illegally proclaimed a straight baseline
extending far from its coastline. The state may have done so to expand its
EEZ and to give its nationals increased fishing rights. Or the state may be
using the extended baseline to claim an expanded area of internal

waters. 248 Or perhaps the state extended the baseline in good faith, believing that it was legal to do so. But many straight baselines proclaimed
worldwide appear to be illegal under the criteria set forth in the Law of the
Sea Convention. 2 49 One ought not assume that a "binding" decision
against a state's straight baseline claim by the ITLOS (or another court or
tribunal) will automatically lead the political authorities of that state to
reverse their position. The ITLOS should recognize that it could lose crediand South West Africa Case (Liber. v. S. Mr.), 1966 L.CJ. 325 (July 18); and the use of
force, see Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 24).
246. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 287(4).

247. See, e.g., Mark W. Janis, Somber Reflections on the CompulsoryJurisdictionof the
InternationalCourt, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1987). Although third-party tribunals do, on
occasion, help to resolve highly politicized disputes and to defuse crises, whether they
are able to do so will in large measure depend on whether both disputing governments,
at the time the case begins, agree that a third-party proceeding is desirable. See, e.g.,
T.D. Gill, Politicaland Legal Disputes and the Problem of "Real Consent," in INTERNATIONAL
ARBn-RaTION: PAST AND PRosPEcrs 195 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990).
A state claiming that a respondent state is responsible for some wrongful act may have
various reasons for resorting to such a "public forum" - even if nonappearance of the
respondent state is foreseen. The applicant state may, for example, be seeking a clear
legal ruling that could be used in future disputes with other states concerning a similar
issue. Or it may be trying to place additional public pressure on the wrongdoer. If the
severity of the violation and the status of relations between the states make proportional
countermeasures an option, a judicial decision against the wrongdoing state also could
obviate an aggrieved state's need to convince others that a violation exists before taking
countermeasures. For discussion of the international law relating to countermeasures,
see ELIsAB=ET ZOLLER, P.AcErlmE UNILATERAL M.Asu s: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEAsuREs (1984).
248. Such a claim could not affect the right of innocent passage. See Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(2) ("Where the establishment of a straight baseline ... has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously
been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention
shall exist in those waters.").
249. According to Article 5 of the Law of the Sea Convention, "the normal baseline for
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast."
Straight baselines are appropriate only in limited geographical situations (e.g., "where
the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity"). Id. art. 7(1). Furthermore, even when such situations
do exist, "[t]he drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast." Id. art. 7(3). For the case that many straight
baseline claims are illegal, see J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES
RESPONDS TO ExCESSIvE MARITIME CLAIMS § 4.6 (2d ed. 1996); W. Michael Reisman et al.,
Straight Baselines in InternationalLaw: A Callfor Reconsideration, 1988 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y
Ir'L L. 260 [hereinafter Reisman, Baselines].
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bility when the accused state either ignores the ITLOS's decision or does
not even bother to appear before the ITLOS to defend itself.
In analyzing straight baseline claims, the ITLOS should acknowledge
that Articles 297 and 298 reflect serious concerns of states. In ruling on
the scope of its jurisdiction 250 and on other preliminary issues relating to
the admissibility of claims, 25 1 the ITLOS should realize that an expansive
attitude concerning its competence could cause it to lose credibility. If the
ITLOS accepts jurisdiction on suspect grounds, it may be viewed as a
25 2
politicized, nonindependent body.

That said, the ITLOS may face difficult characterization problems. Is a
case "really" about baselines or navigational freedoms (issues not within
the Article 297 and 298 limitations and exceptions), or is it about a coastal
state's military activities or EEZ fishing rights (issues that may be subject
to those limitations and exceptions)? Although many characterization
issues are difficult to resolve in a principled manner, 25 3 the ITLOS may
still reach clear conclusions if it interprets the Convention "in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose. '25 4 Suppose, for example,
that a distant water fishing state challenged another state's control over
fishing at the outer edge of the latter state's asserted EEZ. If a right to
exercise control could be claimed only by virtue of the state's proclamation
of a straight baseline, a court or tribunal probably would characterize the
dispute as involving baselines rather than EEZ fishing rights. The Convention straightforwardly defines the EEZ in terms of its baseline, 2 55 and the
coastal state's right to exercise control thus fundamentally depends on the
legality of its straight baseline. 25 6
250. Any dispute over whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction in a case is to be
settled by that court or tribunal. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art.
288(4). See also id. Annex VII, art. 9; Annex VIII, art. 4; ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, art.
58.
251. For example, the court or tribunal to which an application is made has the
authority to determine whether a complaint is well-founded. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 294.
252. Cf. REismAN, supra note 83, at 22-24 (criticizing the ICJ's exercise of jurisdiction
in the Nicaragua Case).
253. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTIcE 71-74
(1993); Boyle, FragmentationandJurisdiction,supra note 75, at 44-45.
254. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). The Vienna Convention authorizes recourse to a
treaty's preparatory work and the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion as supplementary means of interpretation. See id. art. 32. See generally IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATns 114-54 (2d ed. 1984); Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae
Victis or Woe to the Negotiatorsl Your Treaty or Our "Interpretation"of It?, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 358 (1971) (criticizing teleological approaches to treaty interpretation).
255. "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 2, art. 57. The concept of baseline is also defined in the Convention. See id. arts. 5, 7; supra note 249 and accompanying text.
256. Furthermore, any claim that a baseline dispute was only a component of broader
international tensions likely would not change the characterization of the dispute. See,
e.g., Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
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After the ITLOS finds that it has jurisdiction over a highly politicized
dispute, its determination on the merits could be straightforward. The
Convention rule at issue - relating, say, to straight baselines - may be
relatively determinate. The Tribunal would be faced with the traditional
judicial task of applying the rule in light of its purpose.
The ITLOS may use several techniques to bolster its credibility and
legitimacy. 25 7 One such technique is demonstrating its judicial autonomy
and neutrality. When deciding politically sensitive cases, the ITLOS
should not accommodate the political views of particular judges' states.
Nor should it avoid political confrontation. As Helfer and Slaughter write,
"tribunals must be willing to brave political displeasure, searching always
for generalizable principles, even as they search for formulations or procedural mechanisms to render the principles more palatable to the states concerned. ''258 Furthermore, the use of standard, rather than teleological,
methods of treaty interpretation may inspire confidence. 2 59 The ITLOS
should emphasize the core values reflected in the text, object, and purpose
of the Law of the Sea Convention. For example, in a straight baseline case,
the ITLOS should emphasize that a stable system of internationally recognized baselines undergirds an important balance struck at UNCLOS III.
This balance, between the 200-mile EEZ on the one hand, and freedom of
navigation and restrictions on even broader encroachments of coastal state
control over the commons on the other, could be upset by allowing unilateral claims of straight baselines far from the coastline. 2 60 Decisions of new
international courts have been most effective when the courts apply foron their own, precedents and the texts of
malistic reasoning and rely closely
26 1
their constitutive instruments.
Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3, 19-20 (May 24) (rejecting Iranian argument that the Court could not
rule on Iranian violations of international law protecting diplomats and consular officials without also addressing alleged longstanding U.S. interference in Iranian internal

affairs).
257. The concept of legitimacy, as applied to judicial behavior, includes structural
and process components: "impartiality; principled decisionmaking; reasoned decisionmaking; continuity of court composition over time; consistency of judicial decisions
over time; respect for the role of political institutions ...; and provision of a meaningful
opportunity for litigants to be heard." Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 284. See
supra note 170 and accompanying text.
258. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 314.
259. The approaches of the ECJ and European Court of Human Rights to treaty interpretation are not now formalistic or restricted to the original intended meaning of the
applicable conventions. These approaches, however, have evolved only after many years
and with incremental acceptance of the courts' "constitutional nature." See, e.g., id. at
314-17, 382. For sources on treaty interpretation, see supra note 254.
260. See also Reisman, Baselines, supra note 249 (purposes of original expression of a
straight baseline regime tied to economic needs of coastal state, which now may be
satisfied via general acceptance of the EEZ regime).
261. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 314-20. See also Stephen P. Croley &
John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,Standard of Review, and Deference to National
Governments, 90 AM. J. Ir'L L. 193, 212 (1996) (cautioning against "activist" postures
by GATT/WTO panels); Mark W. Janis, The European Court of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENrrIv-FIRsT CENTURY 105, 108-14 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992)
(noting link between the effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights and the
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When the ITLOS interprets and applies the rules of the Convention, it
must anticipate the interests of third states. 2 62 A straight baseline case, for
example, will affect the interests of all maritime powers. Third states may
therefore wish to intervene in such a case. According to Article 31 of the
ITLOS's Statute, a State Party may request permission to intervene if it
"consider[s] that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected
by the decision in any dispute." 2 63 More broadly, States Parties have a
"right to intervene" when the ITLOS's Registrar has notified them that "the
interpretation or application of this Convention is in question," and parties
to an international agreement whose interpretation or application is at
issue also have such a right. 2 64 Any intervening party is bound by the
ITLOS's decision. 26 5 The ICJ's jurisprudence on intervention under its
Statute is controversial and complex, 26 6 and application of the ITLOS's
26 7
rules on intervention also may well be controversial in some instances.
One benefit of a liberal construction and application of the intervention
articles in the ITLOS Statute is that the Tribunal would more likely be fully
informed about the arguments and interests of third states when it renders
its decision.
2. The ITLOS as Legislature?
At times, the ITLOS may be called on to develop legislative standards for
the operation of regimes. This is not a typical function for international
courts or tribunals. Legislative standards usually are negotiated by states
or specified by international regulatory bodies.
care of the Court's judges to extend their authority only gradually). The practice of the
ITLOS in this regard bears watching. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
See also M/V Saiga Case, supra note 6, cl 6 (President Mensah, dissenting); id. 'H 20, 25
(Vice-President Wolfrum & Yamamoto, J., dissenting); id. l 19-22 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for addressing some questions that went beyond those
necessary to decide the prompt release application before the ITLOS).
262. It is uncertain what criteria the ITLOS will apply to determine whether a case
can proceed if a state whose legal interests would likely be affected by a decision is not a
party to the case. The ICJ will find a case inadmissible if the determination of an absent
third state's rights and obligations would "constitute the very subject matter of' the
Court's judgment, a situation the Court contrasts to one where its findings "might affect
the legal interests" of third states. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.CJ. 90, 105
(June 30); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.CJ. 240, 261
(Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26). See generally CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD
PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1993).
263. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 31(1). If the State Party
seeking to intervene has not elected the ITLOS as its preferred forum under Article 287,
the ITLOS nonetheless may grant the request to intervene. See ITLOS Rules, supra note
44, art. 99(3).
264. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 32(2).
265. See id. Annex VI, arts. 31(3), 32(3). See also ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, arts.
99-104.
266. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 45, at 131-35; 3 SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, at 1481-1555, 1637-55 (3d ed.
1997).
267. For discussion of issues concerning the scope of intervention that may be
allowed in ITLOS proceedings, see Rosenne, Points of Difference, supra note 97, at 20812.
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After states adopt a multilateral convention, they may need to adjust
its terms to account for changes in factual circumstances or shifts in political relationships. The parties to the convention also may want to add
detailed rules that states could not agree on, or wanted to leave unspecified, in the initial treaty negotiations. Some multilateral conventions are
framework agreements that authorize states to make subsequent adjustments by majority or supermajority vote (rather than through the normal
treaty amendment process). 268 Instead of requiring further interstate
negotiations to change or add standards, states sometimes delegate standard-setting roles to institutions. For example, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) has developed technical standards in recommendatory
2 69
The
codes that states can choose to incorporate in their national laws.
accepted
tacitly
be
can
that
amendments
treaty
IMO may also develop
270
Less
unless a specified percentage of states vote not to accept them.
supply
to
authority
the
or
tribunals
frequently, states may grant courts
missing regulations in multilateral conventions.
Following UNCLOS III and the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment
and Development, U.N.-sponsored negotiations led to the 1995 Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks. 2 71 This Straddling Stocks Agreement embodies the precautionary
approach with respect to dwindling straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks, broadens the scope of application of regulations of regional fisheries organizations, and increases the enforcement powers of coastal states to
insure compliance with such regional regulations. The Agreement also
contemplates future negotiations. For example, the Agreement requires
states to work together to achieve conservation and management measures

that are compatible in the high seas and the EEZ.2 72 Finally, the Agreement envisions that regional and subregional fisheries organizations may
powers related to establishing conservation and manexercise significant 273
agement measures.

268. See, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,
1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987). See also Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'i L. 259 (1992).
269. See, e.g., International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (1965), as amended,
IMO Sales No. IMO-200E.
270. See, e.g., International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, art.
VIII, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2, 280.
271. Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16. For discussion of the Straddling

Stocks Agreement, see Peter Orebech et al., The United Nations Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement, 13
INT'L J. MARmNE & CoASTAL L. 119 (1998); AndrE Tahindro, Conservationand Management of TransboundaryFish Stocks: Comments in Light of the Adoption of the 1995 Agreementfor the Conservation and Management of StraddlingFish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, 28 OcEAN

DEV'T

& INT'L L. 1 (1997).

272. See Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, art. 7(2).
273. See id. arts. 9-13.
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The states that negotiated the Straddling Stocks Agreement did not
leave all the authority for developing compatible high seas/EEZ conservation and management measures to the parties or intergovernmental organizations. They also contemplated that the ITLOS could play a role in
developing such measures. When states cannot agree on compatible conservation and management measures "within a reasonable time," any party
to the Straddling Stocks Agreement can invoke the Agreement's dispute settlement provisions, 2 74 which incorporate by reference the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV of the Law of the Sea Convention. 2 75 Although
an arbitral tribunal, rather than the ITLOS, has residual compulsory jurisdiction, the ITLOS may well be asked to prescribe provisional measures.
Should states fail to agree on provisional management and conservation
arrangements, the Straddling Stocks Agreement provides that any state
may seek provisional measures. 2 76 Because the Agreement incorporates by
reference the Convention's provisions on provisional measures, the ITLOS,
as the forum with residual compulsory jurisdiction in provisional measure
27 7
cases, probably will be the initial forum to prescribe such measures.
A decision by states to authorize international tribunals to set standards has domestic and international political dimensions. When tribunals set conservation standards, they may help national commerce or
fisheries agencies mollify citizens who are opposed to stringent conservation measures. 2 78 For foreign affairs offices, allocating standard-setting
274. Id. art. 7(4). See id. art. 7(3). This step may not be taken until the Agreement
enters into force; as of November 1998, the Agreement has received 19 of the 30 acceptances necessary for its entry into force.
275. Id. art. 30. Thus, invocation of third-party procedures under this provision will
result in arbitration - the third-party forum with residuary compulsory jurisdiction
under Article 287 of the Convention - unless all states concerned have agreed on the
ITLOS or on some other forum. See id.; supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
276. See id. arts. 7(5), 31(2). See also id. art. 7(6). Provisional measures are also
contemplated when states have been unable to agree on conservation and management
measures for areas of high seas surrounded entirely by an area under the national jurisdiction of one state. See id. art. 16(2), 31(2). More generally, a court or tribunal hearing
a dispute under the Straddling Stocks Agreement may also "prescribe any provisional
measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the
respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent damage to the stocks in question." Id. art. 31(2).
277. See id. arts. 30, 31(2); Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 290(5); supra
notes 149-50 and accompanying text. The ITLOS will not have jurisdiction if the parties
have agreed on another court or tribunal to issue provisional measures. See id. Furthermore, a party to the Straddling Stocks Agreement that is not a party to the Law of the Sea
Convention "may declare that, notwithstanding article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention, the [ITLOS] shall not be entitled to prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures without the agreement of such State." Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16,
art. 31(3). See Tahindro, supra note 271, at 47-48. Among the 19 states that, as of
November 1998, have accepted the Straddling Stocks Agreement, only the United States
is affected by Article 31(3); all the others are parties to the Convention on the Law of the
Sea. For a list of parties to the Agreement, see Div. for Ocean Affairs, Law of the Sea,
supra note 8.
278. If the ITLOS renders a decision prescribing provisional conservation measures,
it could serve as a scapegoat; its decision may be followed, though at the same time
being publicly criticized by some governmental officials and other important entities.
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competence to a tribunal is one response to the difficulty, in multilateral
negotiations, of devising specific remedies to conserve endangered fish
stocks quickly.
If states, in extremis, do turn to the ITLOS for assistance in fashioning
a high seas/EEZ management regime, the Tribunal will face some daunting
challenges. It is not certain that the ITLOS would have jurisdiction to issue
provisional measures with respect to all affected states.2 79 Even if the
ITLOS does have jurisdiction, it, like other international institutions that
set standards affecting the economic interests of individuals and businesses, may face challenges insofar as it is not representative, its proceed280
ings are insufficiently transparent, and its actions lack legitimacy.
How should the ITLOS handle the delicate task of formulating conservation measures? The Straddling Stocks Agreement provides that any provisional measures shall, inter alia, "have due regard to the rights and
obligations of all States concerned [and] shall not jeopardize or hamper the
reaching of final agreement on compatible conservation measures .... -1281
The ITLOS must be sensitive to the status of interstate negotiations when
the case is submitted. If there is a high degree of consensus among states,
the ITLOS should accept and build on that consensus. If, on the other
hand, states are bitterly divided, the ITLOS should, consistent with international law, specify the contours for further negotiations. 28 2 Particularly at
See, e.g., BiLDER, INTERNATIONAL DisPuTE SarrnmENr, supra note 14, at 61-62; Robert E.

Hudec, "Transcending the Ostensible": Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation
Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1987).
279. If all the states whose interests are significantly affected by a straddling stocks
management regime are parties to the Straddling Stocks Agreement, a state asking the
ITLOS to help formulate standards for a comprehensive regime might name those states
as parties to the litigation. If all affected states are not parties to the Agreement but are
parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, they might still be brought into the litigation.
Disputes characterized as EEZ fishing disputes are, however, subject to jurisdictional
limitations. See Law of the Sea Convention, supranote 2, art. 297. See also id. Annex VI,
arts. 31-32 (on intervention). *
A multiparty proceeding may also pose management problems for the ITLOS.
Because the Rules of the ITLOS do not provide details concerning the conduct of a
multiparty case before the Tribunal or its Fisheries Chamber, see supra note 99 and
accompanying text, consultation among the Tribunal and the parties about details of
procedure is likely. See ITLOS Rules, supra note 44, arts. 45, 48. See also id. art. 47
(Tribunal may direct the joinder of proceedings in two or more cases).
280. Such concerns have been raised with respect to the U.N. Security Council,
which, since the end of the Cold War, has taken steps that increasingly affect private
entities. See, e.g., David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993).
281. Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, art. 7(6).
282. Cf. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.J. 3 (July 25). It is not
certain that the ITLOS or another court or tribunal could alter a coastal state's fisheries
regulations in an effort to develop compatible conservation measures. This is because
the Straddling Stocks Agreement incorporates by reference the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, including Article 297's limitations concerning EEZ fisheries disputes. See supra notes 70, 81-82, 275 and accompanying text.
If the coastal state's measures are effectively unmodifiable, then a coastal state would
have some leverage in arguing that any conservation measures applicable on the high
seas conform to its EEZ measures. See McDorman, supra note 113.
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the provisional measures stage, it is questionable whether the ITLOS
should prescribe highly detailed measures; instead, it may be desirable to
encourage states to continue negotiating pursuant to a prescribed general
framework while the merits stage of the case is pending.
The ITLOS should bear in mind that the goal of standard-setting in
such a case is to help implement important community rights or interests.
The Straddling Stocks Agreement, in particular, reflects concerns that fish
stocks are in serious decline, 2 83 and that this decline poses a serious problem for humanity. Thus, the ITLOS should prescribe provisional measures
appropriate not only to "preserve the respective rights of the parties to the
dispute" but also to "prevent damage to the stocks in question. '28 4 The
Agreement explicitly authorizes an international court or tribunal to apply,
among other sources, "generally accepted standards for the conservation
and management of living marine resources," and the law is to be applied
"with a view to ensuring the conservation of the straddling fish
stocks... concerned." 28 5 In broader terms, the Agreement's overall objective "is to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. '28 6 The Law of the Sea
Convention also, albeit less directly than the Straddling Stocks Agreement,
28 7
aims to further community interests in the conservation of species.
Neither the Law of the Sea Convention nor the Straddling Stocks
Agreement gives individuals or nongovernmental organizations standing to
institute conservation actions. Nevertheless, the ITLOS, if asked to set
standards in fisheries management disputes, should take community interests in the conservation of species into account. 2 88 Its decisions in support of a conservation regime, particularly if unanimous, 28 9 could
underscore the importance of the community interests involved.

283. See 1997 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 99, 11 191-97.
284. Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 16, art. 31(2).
285. Id. art. 30(5); see supra text accompanying note 82.
286. Id. art. 2. Among the Agreement's general purposes is "the need to avoid adverse
impacts on the marine environment, preserve biodiversity, maintain the integrity of
marine ecosystems and minimize the risk of long-term or irreversible effects of fishing
operations." Id. Preamble.
287. Part XII of the Convention contains both detailed provisions implementing the
obligation of states "to protect and preserve the marine environment." Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 2, art. 192, and general provisions requiring states to take steps
to conserve and manage living resources. See id. arts. 116-20. Furthermore, the Convention authorizes provisional measures, inter alia, "to prevent serious harm to the
marine environment." Id. art. 290(1). See supra note 145 and accompanying text;

Oxman, Human Rights, supra note 80, at 408-10.
288. If the Tribunal's Rules were amended to allow nongovernmental organizations to
file amicus briefs, its access to perspectives on conservation issues would increase. See
generally Shelton, supra note 18.
289. The ITLOS's first provisional measure order, in a case related to the seizure and
detention of a vessel by a coastal state, was unanimous. See M/V Saiga (No. 2), supra
note 6. For discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of unanimous decisions by
international courts, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 326-28.
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The ITLOS as Court of Equity?

The ITLOS could hear disputes involving the delimitation of adjacent and
opposite maritime boundaries, relying on equity.2 90 The ICJ's decision in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases2 9 ' illustrates how equity might be
used in deciding such disputes. The ICJ's reliance on equity was controversial in those cases because the ICJ's Statute does not list equity among the
sources of international law to which the Court may refer. 29 2 Nevertheless, it was sensible for the ICJ to refer to equity, in light of the fact-intensive nature of maritime boundary delimitations, the uncertainty of the
applicable positive law, the ICJ's desire to reach a fair result helpful to the
293
parties, and the discretion inherent in the judicial process.
Should the ITLOS hear maritime boundary delimitation cases involving States Parties to the Convention, the Tribunal will refer initially to Convention articles rather than equity. Nevertheless, the ICJ's use of equity in
its delimitation cases remains instructive. The Convention's provisions
governing delimitations of the EEZ and the continental shelf provide few
definite standards for a tribunal to apply.2 94 The fact-intensive nature of.
maritime delimitations make it unlikely that very precise norms will ever
29 5
be accepted to govern such disputes.
In some cases involving maritime boundary delimitation disputes, the
states may not want the court or tribunal actually to delimit the boundary.
For example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ was asked
only to determine the principles applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf, and not to set the boundary itself.2 96 The ICJ's decision left
room for the parties to continue negotiations after the decision. It only
provided principles to help guide them in their negotiations. Should states
submit such cases, the ITLOS should be open to the states' need for flexi290. If the states involved have not filed an optional exception under Article 298(1)(a)
of the Law of the Sea Convention, then an arbitral tribunal would have residual jurisdiction in maritime boundary delimitation disputes. Thus, jurisdiction of the ITLOS would
depend on mutual agreement, either in the form of mutual declarations under Article
287(4), a compromissory clause in a treaty, or a special agreement. If one or more of the
states involved have filed relevant Article 298 exceptions, the states nonetheless remain
free to agree to submit a particular maritime boundary dispute to the ITLOS. See Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 299.
291. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3

(Feb. 20).
292. See ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 38(1). The states involved had not agreed to
allow the Court to decide the case ex aequo et bono. See supra note 76. If an international court broadly uses equity, unconstrained by legal standards, it may open itself to

criticisms that its adjudication approaches a standardless conciliation. See MERRILLS,
supra note 45, at 154-55.
293. See generally

CHRISTOPHER

R. Rossi, EqUITy AND

INTERNATIONAL LAw

215-46

(1993).
294. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 74, 83.
295. See Jonathan I. Charney, Introduction, in 1 INTERmATiONAL MARITIME BouNrUDAES
xxiii, xliii-xliv (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993) [hereinafter 1
MARInME BOUNDARIES].
296. Accord Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.CJ. 18 (Feb. 24). In other
cases, the Court has been asked to determine the boundary. See, e.g., Continental Shelf
(Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.CJ. 13 (June 3).
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ble guidelines. 2 97
It is far from certain that the ITLOS will hear maritime boundary
delimitation disputes. The absence of compulsory jurisdiction over such
cases, the experience of the ICJ and arbitral tribunals in handling such
disputes, and the desire of some states to have the prestige of the ICJ associated with any delimitation may restrict the number of boundary disputes
submitted to the ITLOS. Should the Tribunal hear such disputes, however,
it may operate as a "court of equity."
C. The ITLOS as Constitutional Court?
Part XI of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, as modified by the
1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement, 298 contains a comprehensive
regime that governs the mining of resources in the Area, i.e., "the sea-bed
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. ''2 99 The Council of the International Sea-Bed Authority has the power
to approve plans of work for exploration and exploitation of the Area. 30 0 In
1997, it approved exploration plans for seven state and private pioneer
investors. 3° 1 Once an application for a plan of work is approved, the applicant enters into a contract with the Authority.
The Part XI regime recognizes property rights for entities seeking to
explore for or exploit minerals in an international common space. As mod297. Should two states bring a maritime boundary dispute to the ITLOS, the interests
of third states may be implicated. The Tribunal may face difficult questions concerning
admissibility and the scope of intervention in such cases. See supra notes 262-67 and
accompanying text. See also David Colson, The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary
Agreements, in 1 MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 295, at 41, 63.
298. Part XI Agreement, supra note 4.
299. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1). "Resources" include "all
solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed,
including polymetallic nodules." Id. art. 133(a).
300. Approval follows a recommendation from the Authority's Legal and Technical
Commission. Procedures for approval are near-automatic once prospective miners have
met specified conditions. See Part XI Agreement, supra note 4, Annex, § 3, art. 11.
Removing discretion in the approval process was only one of several changes made in
the 1994 Agreement to assuage concerns of developed states. Other changes concern
costs to States Parties, subjecting the functioning of the Enterprise to market-oriented
principles, the decision-making process of the Authority, the procedure for amending
Part XI, removing limits on the production of sea-bed minerals, economic assistance,
and other financial issues. See Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and the Convention, 88 AM. J. Ir'L L. 687 (1994); Recommendation and Report on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 29 INT'L LAw. 252 (1995), reprinted in THE UNITED
NATIONS AT 50: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING ITS EFFECTIVENESS 161 (John E. Noyes ed.,
1997).
301. See 1997 Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 99, 1125. Most sea-bed mineral
resources are in the continental shelf and thus within areas of national jurisdiction. The
future commercial viability of deep sea-bed mining remains uncertain. See Panel on the
Law of Ocean Uses, Deep Seabed Mining and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 363, 363 (1988). But see Michael Field, Norway and Cook Islands in
Major Seabed Mining Deal, AGENCE FRANcE-PR.ssE, Sept. 22, 1997, available in 1997
WESTLAW 13399707 (describing advances in sea-bed mining technology). Politically
motivated deep sea-bed mining remains conceivable. See SEEBERG-ELVERPELDT, supra note
89, at 20.

1998

InternationalTribunal for the Law of the Sea

ified by the 1994 Implementation Agreement, Convention provisions allow
the boundaries of claims to be established, guarantee exclusive access to
mine sites with security of tenure, protect mining contracts against unilateral revision, and protect intellectual property. 30 2 It is true that Part XI of
the Convention recognizes that "[t]he Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind"30 3 and provides that the "financial and other
economic benefits derived from activities in the Area" be shared equitably,
"taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing
States." 30 4 Nevertheless, the power to implement these goals does not rest
with developing states. The 1994 Agreement gives developed states an
effective veto over "[r]ules, regulations, and procedures on the equitable
sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in
30 5
the Area and the decisions to be made thereon."
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS plays a central role in the
regime for mining the Area. The focus in the following discussion is not on
the Chamber's role as a commercial court, ruling on the interpretation of a
mining contract. 30 6 Rather, the focus is on the Chamber's potential role as
a "constitutional court," reviewing the legality of the Sea-Bed Authority's
rules, regulations, and procedures that affect private commercial mining
rights. If, for example, the Authority acted administrtively to impair a consortium's contract to explore for polymetallic nodules because the Authority concluded that the consortium had not complied with one of the
Authority's regulations, would a "constitutional" challenge of the Authority's action be possible? If so, what form might the challenge take? Suppose the regulation in question addressed procedures to assure
noninterference with historical shipwrecks, 30 7 and the consortium argued
that the Authority's regulation was not, as the Law of the Sea Convention
requires, within the Authority's express powers and functions. 30 8
302. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 153(3), (6), 168(2)-(3) &
Annex III, arts. 4, 8, 19, 22; Part XI Agreement, supra note 4, Annex, §§ 1(9), 5.
303. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 136.
304. Id. art. 160(f)(i); see id. art. 140(1). For discussion of the common heritage of
mankind concept, see, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'' & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986).
305. Part XI Agreement, supra note 4, Annex, § 9(7)(0. These rules, regulations, procedures, and decisions are to be made by the Authority's Council following recommendations of the Finance Committee, and must be based on those recommendations. See
id. §§ 3(7), 9(7)(0. The Finance Committee, on which developed states are represented,
must operate by consensus, which means that the objection of any member may block
action. See id. § 9(8).
306. A commercial arbitral tribunal is also available for this purpose, at the request of
any party to a mining contract. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art.
188(2)(a); infra text accompanying notes 321-22.
307. See id. art. 149. For discussion of Article 149, see ANAsTASIA STRATI, THE PROTECTION OF THE UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE: AN EMERGING OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTEM-

PORARY LAW OF THE SEA 296-312 (1995).
308. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 157(2). The Convention does
grant the Authority "such incidental powers, consistent with this Convention, as are
implicit in and necessary for the exercise of those [express] powers and functions with
respect to activities in the Area." Id. See also id. art. 145 (Authority may take necessary
measures, with respect to activities in the Area, to protect the marine environment).
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To evaluate how the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber might review the
Authority's actions, it is important to place this eleven-member Chamber in
the context in which it was created. The Sea-Bed' Disputes Chamber is a
product of an UNCLOS III compromise "between those who wanted a separate tribunal to deal with disputes relating to activities in the Area and
those who felt that a single tribunal should be adequate." 30 9 Those who
favored a separate Sea-Bed Tribunal envisioned it as a principal organ the judicial arm - of the Sea-Bed Authority. 31 0 The 1976 proposal of the
President of UNCLOS III to create a Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the
ITLOS instead of a separate Sea-Bed Tribunal 3 1 1 found its way into the
1977 Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). 3 12 According to the
ICNT, however, members of the Chamber were to be elected by the Assembly of the Authority, thereby establishing a strong linkage between the
organizations. Although this election mechanism was ultimately abandoned in favor of electing Chamber members by a majority of the ITLOS's
judges, 3 13 some links between the Authority and the Chamber remain. In
particular, the Authority's Assembly may adopt general recommendations
concerning representation in the Chamber of the world's different regions
and principal legal systems.3 14 In addition, the Authority, as well as States
Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, are to bear the expenses of the
ITLOS. 3 15 The Authority may be a party to proceedings before the Sea-Bed

Disputes Chamber. 3 16 And the Chamber must give advisory opinions,
when so requested by the Assembly or Council, relating to "legal questions
arising within the scope of their activities." 3 17 In sum, although the ITLOS
is an independent legal entity, and its Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber is by no
means an organ of the Authority, 3 18 legal ties between the Chamber and
the Authority remain.
Whether the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber may function effectively as a
constitutional court also depends on whether it was designed to be the sole
309. 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, A.VI.170, at 399. For a pre-UNCLOS III proposal concerning an Ocean Floor Tribunal, noting various categories of disputes such a
Tribunal could hear, see Report of the Deep-Sea Mining Committee, in INTERNATIONAL LAw
AsS'N, REPORT OF THE FIm-FouRT CONFmECE 870, 886, 890, 905-06 (1971).
310. See AoEDE, supra note 27, at 143, 185-86, 267.
311. Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/Rev.2 (1976),
Annex II, art. 15, reprintedin VI Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records, at 144, 151, U.N. Sales No. E.77.V.2 (1976).
312. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977), Annex V, reprinted in VIII Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records 1, 59, U.N. Sales No.
E.78.V.4 (1977) [hereinafter ICNT].
313. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 35.
314. See id. Annex VI, art. 35(2).
315. See id. Annex VI, art. 19(1).
316. See id. arts. 162(2)(u), 165(2)(i); supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text;
infra notes 323, 328-31 and accompanying text.
317. Id. art. 191; see supra text accompanying note 148. For discussion of these various links between the Authority and the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, see 5 COMMENTARY,
supra note 10, Jc A.VI.174-175, 177.
318. Efforts have been made to insure the independence of the Tribunal and its
administrative functions in the arrangements respecting the establishment of the Tribunal and the Authority. See Rosenne, Points of Difference, supra note 97, at 204-05.
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arbiter of Part XI disputes. UNCLOS III negotiators debated this point.
Some delegations preferred arbitration, which would allow parties to select
some of the decision makers, and also wanted to give parties considerable
flexibility in their choice of forum.3 19 On the other hand, many held that
it was more important to have a uniform interpretation of Part XI:
The regime established with respect to activities in the Area was new, unusual and without precedent, and required strengthening through consistent
jurisprudence. That consistency would not be achieved if parallel forums the International Court of Justice, the Tribunal, and general or special arbitral tribunals - were all to have equal jurisdiction over disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of Part XI, notwithstanding the general
applicability of Part XV to the remainder of the Convention. To ensure consistent jurisprudence, exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning the
or application of Part XI would have to be conferred on a sininterpretation
320
gle body.
The compromise that emerged at UNCLOS III generally favored maintaining the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber as the central interpretive body for
Part XI. Although, in contract disputes, one party may elect commercial
arbitration, 3 2 1 the arbitral tribunal must refer questions of interpretation
of Part XI and its Annexes to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. 32 2 Only the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber may hear disputes between the Authority and a
State Party concerning acts of the Authority alleged to violate Part XI or to
exceed its jurisdiction. 3 23 States Parties have limited flexibility to choose
fora in disputes among themselves, 32 4 and when interpretation of Part XI is
at issue, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber or its ad hoc chamber will be the
likely forum. 32 5 According to one commentator, "a practically uniform
32 6
adjudication" of Part XI disputes "can be assumed."
Part XI provides several possible avenues for the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber to review the legality of the Authority's measures. First, the
Chamber can use its advisory jurisdiction. 32 7 An advisory opinion, however, may lack efficacy. The Authority must request such an opinion, and
319. These delegations noted with approval the flexibility provided by Part XV's Article 287. See AIE.E, supra note 27, at 187. For discussion of Article 287, see supra notes
50-54, 56-57 and accompanying text.
320. 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, '1 A.VI.191, at 409.
321. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 188(2)(a).
322. Id.
323. See id. art. 187(b).
324. See id. art. 188(1).
325. Instead of proceeding before the full Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, one State Party

may choose to have a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Part XI
heard before a smaller, ad hoc chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. Id. art.
188(1)(b); see id. Annex VI, art. 36. Alternatively, all the parties may agree to refer the
dispute to another special chamber of the ITLOS. Id. art. 188(1)(a); see id. Annex VI,
arts. 15, 17; supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. The Part XI Implementation
Agreement also provides for the use of GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanisms in
certain cases. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
326. SEBERG-ELVER.ELDT, supra note 89, at 81.

327. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 191; supra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text.
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the phrasing of the question is likely to shape the scope of the Chamber's
opinion.
Second, in cases between the Authority and a State Party, Part XI
authorizes the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to exercise jurisdiction in disputes over the legality of certain measures of the Authority. The Chamber
has jurisdiction in disputes between those entities concerning:
(i) acts or omissions of the Authority or of a State Party alleged to be in
violation of [Part XI] or the Annexes relating thereto or of rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority adopted in accordance therewith; or
(ii) acts of8 the Authority alleged to be in excess of jurisdiction or a misuse of
32
power.
Third, it is possible that natural or juridical persons may challenge the
Authority's measures. In general, Part XI and the Statute of the ITLOS contemplate that natural or juridical persons registered with the Sea-Bed
Authority to engage in deep sea-bed exploration or mining may (along with
States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise, and state enterprises) be
parties to cases before the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber involving mining
contract disputes. 32 9 Article 187(c)(ii) provides for jurisdiction of the SeaBed Disputes Chamber in disputes between parties to a contract, including
natural or juridical persons and the Authority, concerning "acts or omissions of a party to the contract [e.g., the Authority] relating to activities in
the Area and directed to the other party or directly affecting its legitimate
interests." 3 30 The Chamber may also hear other types of disputes between
the Authority and natural or juridical persons. 331
Article 189 limits the Sea-Bed Dispute Chamber's ability to review the
legality of a rule or regulation of the Authority. Article 189 reads:
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall have no jurisdiction with regard to the
exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers in accordance with this
Part; in no case shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Authority.
328. Id. art. 187(b). For discussion of Article 187(b), see SEEBERc-ELVERFELDT, supra
note 89, at 101-10.
329. See id. art. 187 (jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber); id. Annex VI, art.
37 (access).
330. For discussion of the application of Article 187(c)(ii) to suits by investors against
the Authority, see SEEBERG-ELVERFELDT, supra note 89, at 122-30. Article 187(c)(ii) contains a cross-reference to Article 153(2)(b), which concerns the requirement of state
sponsorship for natural or juridical persons seeking to engage in sea-bed mining. For
discussion of the requirement of state sponsorship, see id. at 76-77.
331. Article 187(c)(i) provides for jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber in
disputes concerning "the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or plan of
work." Article 187(e) authorizes Chamber jurisdiction in disputes "in which it is alleged
that the Authority has incurred liability" for, inter alia, disclosure of confidential or
proprietary information. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 168(2);
Annex III, art. 22. For discussion of Article 187(e) and the liability of the Authority and
its organs, see SEEBERG-ELVERFELDT, supra note 89, at 101-02, 132-37. Article 187(d)
provides for Chamber jurisdiction in "disputes between the Authority and a prospective
contractor... concerning the refusal of a contract or a legal issue arising in the negotiation of the contract." For discussion, see id. at 116-22. See also supra note 300. Article
190 allows some participation of States Parties in certain proceedings in which natural
or juridical persons are parties. For discussion of Article 190, see supra note 124.
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Without prejudice to article 191 [concerning advisory opinions], in exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to article 187, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber
shall not pronounce itself on the question of whether any rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority are in conformity with this Convention, nor
declare invalid any such rules, regulations and procedures. Its jurisdiction
in this regard shall be confined to deciding claims that the application of any
rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority in individual cases would
be in conflict with the contractual obligations of the parties to the dispute or
their obligations under this Convention, claims concerning excess of jurisdiction or misuse of power, and to claims for damages to be paid or other
remedy to be given to the party concerned for the failure of the other party
to comply with its contractual obligations or its obligations under this
Convention.
Thus, although the Chamber is not authorized to invalidate any rules, regulations, or procedures of the Authority, the Chamber does retain some formal powers of review. It may decide whether the "application" of the
Authority's rule, regulation, or procedure in a particular case conflicts with
the "obligations under th[e] Convention" of any party to a case (which
could include the Authority). The Chamber may also rule on "claims concerning excess of jurisdiction or misuse of power." 33 2 These concepts
could provide a basis for checking any abuses of power by the Authority.
During UNCLOS III, some delegations sought to shield the Authority
from any judicial review whatsoever. They analogized the Authority's
power to that of coastal states, noting that the Convention insulates many
discretionary coastal state actions from judicial review. 333 One may criticize this restrictive view of judicial review on two related levels. First, the
analogy to review of coastal states' exercise of power is inapposite. Historically, international courts or tribunals have not subjected states' acts to
judicial review. Instead, the legality of a state's actions is traditionally challenged by other states through diplomatic procedures - procedures
unavailable to challenge the Authority's rules. Second, states, in their
332. For discussion of these concepts, see SEEBERG-ELVERFELDT, supra note 89, at 10307. Early negotiating texts at UNCLOS III omitted the language concerning "excess of
jurisdiction or misuse of power" and reflected, in stronger form than the final version of
Article 189, a desire to shield the Authority's actions from judicial review. For example,
the relevant provision of the 1977 Informal Composite Negotiating Text read:
In exercising its jurisdiction.., the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber... shall not
pronounce itself on the question whether any rules, regulations or procedures
adopted by the Assembly or by the Council are in conformity with the provisions of the present Convention. Its jurisdiction with regard to such rules, regulations and procedures shall be confined to their application to individual cases.
The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber shall have no jurisdiction with regard to the
exercise by the Assembly or by the Council or any of its organs of their discretionary powers under this Part of the present Convention; in no case shall it
substitute its discretion for that of the Authority.
ICNT, supra note 312, art. 191.
333. See ADEDE, supra note 27, at 150; SBERG-ELVERFnLDT, supra note 89, at 96 (noting view that legislative decisions of the Authority are "those of a sovereign and as such
not subject to any revision" by the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber). Coastal states' acts concerning EEZ activities are, to a significant extent, shielded from compulsory third-party
dispute settlement. For discussion, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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EEZs, have the discretion to decide whether to allocate fisheries and other
resources to private parties. Because the Convention guarantees private
property rights with respect to sea-bed mining, mechanisms to help ensure
that the Authority's rules or regulations do not denigrate these rights are
3 34
desirable.
That said, judicial review follows different models. Judicial review
does not always entail the capacity to invalidate a legislature's measures,
even in national legal systems. 33 5 The ICJ currently is addressing the
proper scope of its review of U.N. Security Council decisions. In the Lockerbie Case,33 6 Libya has asked the ICJ to find that the Security Council
exceeded its powers by issuing binding decisions that allegedly violate
terms of a treaty. 33 7 Only a few ICJ judges have been willing to entertain
the notion that, perhaps in some egregious case of Security Council abuse,
the ICJ might find that the law is not in accordance with a Security Council
decision. 33 8 It seems probable that the ICJ will not declare the Security
Council's actions illegal or invalid, but may instead suggest the outer limits
of fair application or interpretation of a Security Council decision.
One must be cautious about drawing close analogies between the ICJ's
reluctance to engage in judicial review and the likely attitude of the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber. The Chamber, unlike the ICJ, will face a Convention
article (Article 189) that speaks directly to the scope of judicial review.
Furthermore, the Law of the Sea Convention does not contain an analog to
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, which makes state obligations under the
U.N. Charter (including the Article 25 obligation to accept and carry out
Security Council decisions) supreme over other treaties. At a minimum,
these distinctions suggest that the Chamber should be able to review
whether the Sea-Bed Authority applied its rules and regulations legally in
individual cases. Still, the scope of the Chamber's review of legislative/
executive actions will develop only over time, as part of an evolutionary
process in which the Chamber and the Authority work out their relationship with each other. Although the Chamber is not a coordinate body of
the Authority, in the sense that the ICJ is the judicial arm of the United
334. Cf. Treaty of Rome, supra note 154, art. 173. The revised procedures for approving plans of work and for adopting rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority,
contained in the 1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement, suggest that measures contrary to the interests of any powerful block of states likely would not be taken in the first
place. See Part XI Agreement, supra note 4, Annex, §§ 1, 3, 8-9; supra note 300.
335. See JosE E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 Am.J. Irr'L L. 1, 24 n.132
(1996) [hereinafter Alvarez, Judging the Security Council].
336. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.CJ. 3 (Apr. 14)
(Provisional Measures); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.CJ.
114 (Apr. 14) (Provisional Measures). See also Peter H.F. Bekker, InternationalDecision,

92 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 503 (1998).

337. Articles 25, 48, and 103 of the U.N. Charter provide for the binding effect and
priority of Security Council decisions.
338. See Libya v. U.S., at 142 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion); id. at 164-81
(Weearamantry, J., dissenting). But see id. at 210 (E1-Kosheri, J., dissenting) (declaring
portion of Security Council Resolution 748 to be ultra vires).
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Nations, the Chamber nevertheless maintains significant ties to Part XI and
the Authority. The Chamber has a strong interest in the effective and
proper functioning of the Part XI regime. It may prod the Authority,
through interpretations of Part XI, to uphold the basic precepts underlying
33 9
that regime.
Whether the ITLOS's Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber can become the
authoritative "constitutional" interpreter of Part XI will depend on its relationships with other entities involved with the international law of the sea,
including national courts. Article 39 of the ITLOS Statute provides an
explicit link between the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber and national courts.
This Article provides that "decisions of the Chamber shall be enforceable
in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or
orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought."340 Annex III contains a complementary provision: "Any
final decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under
this Convention relating to the rights and obligations of the Authority and
of the contractor shall be enforceable in the territory of each State
Party. '34 1 Despite some uncertainties about the application of these provi-

sions, 34 2 the evident goal is to contribute to the cohesiveness of the Part XI
system, and to ensure that the rights protected by Part XI, as modified by
the 1994 Implementation Agreement, are given full effect. These provi3 43
sions have a parallel in Articles 187 and 192 of the Treaty of Rome,
which require the national courts of member states to recognize judgments
3 44
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Despite the enforcement provisions just noted, the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber's rulings against States Parties or the Authority may well be unenforceable in national courts. A Chamber decision against a State Party
might conflict with rules that grant immunities to states when national
courts seek to attach-state property to enforce a judgment. 345 The privileges and immunities of the Authority could also render it immune from
national legal process (absent waiver6 by the Authority) and immunize its
34
property and assets from seizure.
339. See generally Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, supra note 335; Antonio R.F.
Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-DialogicAbstention by the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INr'L L. 399 (1997).
340. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 39.
341. Id. Annex III, art. 21(2).
342. For example, the implications of the reference to "the highest court" in Article 39
of the ITLOS Statute may not always be clear, if the highest court of a particular state
does not render enforceable decisions, or if atypical procedures are used for enforcing
decisions of the highest court. See 5 CoMMETAtrr~Y, supra note 10, A.VI.203, at 415.
343. Treaty of Rome, supra note 154.
344. Accord Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nations of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 54(1), 575 U.N.T.S. 160, 194 (1996).
345. See ADEDE, supra note 27, at 146, 164 n.37.
346. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 177-79. See also id. Annex IV,
art. 13 (privileges and immunities of the Enterprise); Agreement on Privileges and
Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, openedfor signatureJuly
1, 1997, art. 5, SPLOS/25 (1997).
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More fundamentally, the deep sea-bed mining regime lacks several features that would make the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber a central "constitutional" component of an integrated international system. The Law of the
Sea Convention, unlike the Treaty of Rome, contains no provision authorizing a preliminary reference procedure from national courts to the international tribunal. 3 47 ECJ doctrines holding that provisions of the Treaty of
Rome apply directly to individuals in national courts without the need for
implementing legislation, that European Community law supercedes conflicting national law in national courts, and that conflicting national legislation is preempted 348 seem unlikely to be developed in the context of
disputes over deep sea-bed mining. Even if some such disputes were heard
in national courts, the common European socio-legal traditions, necessary
preconditions to the gradual expansion of the ECJ's authority, are not replicated universally.
In sum, one must qualify the notion that the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber may act as a "constitutional" court. Structurally, the Chamber is a part
of the independent ITLOS, rather than an organ of the Sea-Bed Authority.
It may, however, rule on whether the Authority's rules and regulations have
been applied consistently with Part XI of the Convention and the 1994 Part
XI Implementation Agreement in individual cases. It also may decide
claims concerning misuse of power or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Sea-Bed Authority. 34 9 Such rulings, along with opinions rendered in
the exercise of the Chamber's advisory jurisdiction, may guide the Authority's actions and help protect property rights under the Part XI regime.
D. Summary
This Part of this Article has characterized the ITLOS as an institution that,
within the broad field of the law of the sea, could exercise positive normreinforcing, legislative, equitable, and constitutional functions. It may conceivably play other roles as well; I do not claim to have set out a complete
iypology of its functions. 35 0 In the exercise of these functions, the ITLOS
will address different audiences - sometimes the political branches of two
states, sometimes multiple states, sometimes individuals, sometimes
national courts, and sometimes other international institutions. I have
also suggested some techniques that the ITLOS might employ in deciding
these different types of cases. Those assessing the work of this new international court should consider its various audiences and the different decision-making techniques its judges may need to use.
347. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 154, art. 177.
348. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100
(1991).
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2403, 2413-19

349. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts. 187(b), 189.
350. For example, a chamber of the ITLOS might adopt some of the characteristics of
an arbitral tribunal when hearing bilateral disputes submitted pursuant to a special
agreement, e.g., by deferring to the parties' wishes concerning the composition of the
chamber. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. In addition, the Tribunal's SeaBed Disputes Chamber could function as a commercial court in disputes concerning
sea-bed mining contracts. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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UII. Reflections on the Risks of Inconsistent Jurisprudence and
Duplicative Proceedings
The risk of inconsistent jurisprudence exists whenever parties may freely
choose among various third-party dispute settlement fora. As Jonathan
Charney has argued, inconsistent interpretations of international law "may
undermine the presumed uniformity and universality" of the international
35 2
legal system 3 5 1 and "place[ ] at risk" the coherence of that system.
Inconsistent interpretations could also undercut the important utility of
compulsory third-party adjudication in stabilizing Law of the Sea Convention norms.3 53 With respect to law of the sea disputes, the Convention
allows parties to choose among several fora. This flexibility led negotiators
at UNCLOS 111, 3 5 4 officials participating in the work of Prepcom's Special
Commission 4,355 judges on the ICJ, 35 6 and commentators 35 7 to highlight
the potential problem of inconsistent jurisprudence. The remainder of this
Article addresses this concern, along with the related issue of potential parallel proceedings in the same case.
A.

The Risk of Inconsistent Jurisprudence

The risk of inconsistent decisions is minimal when the ITLOS has exclusive
or residual compulsory jurisdiction. In sea-bed mining cases, for example,
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber exercises primary jurisdiction. Despite the
fact that different chambers may hear certain cases, 35 8 the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has exclusive jurisdiction in disputes between States Parties to the Convention and the Authority. The Chamber will also review
rulings of commercial arbitral tribunals concerning interpretations of Part
XI. Furthermore, the Authority may ask the full Chamber for advisory
opinions if there is any significant divergence in interpretations of Part XI
351. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 81.
352. Id. at 89.
353. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
354. See 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 10, c cl 287.1, A.VI.191.
355. Prepcom's Special Commission 4 discussed the risk of inconsistent rulings
among the ITLOS and its chambers after UNCLOS III and before the Convention entered
into force. A harmonization proposal was put forward to address the risk of inconsistent views between the ITLOS and one of its chambers, or between two or more of the
Tribunal's chambers. See Brown, Dispute Settlement, supra note 45, at 43. The ITLOS
Rules, supra note 44, do not, however, provide any mechanism to respond to the potential of inconsistent chamber rulings.
356. See, e.g., Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of InternationalJudicial Institutions, 44
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 855 (1995); Oda, supra note 10, at 144-55; Shigeru Oda, Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 863 (1995). See

also Robert Y.Jennings, The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and Possible
Answers, in

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES
FOR DisPuTE RESOLUTION 2 (1995). Some judges on the ICJ also fear that the ITLOS

could cause the ICJ to lose business. See Oda, supra note 10, at 144.
357. See, e.g., SINGH, supra note 33, at 73-74, 96. Jonathan Charney has thoughtfully
analyzed concerns about inconsistent jurisprudence. See Charney, Third Party Dispute
Settlement, supra note 1, at 76-89.
358. See supra notes 101-03, 323-25 and accompanying text.
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in cases decided by different chambers. 35 9
The ITLOS is also likely to hear almost all of the Article 292 prompt
release cases. Although an arbitral tribunal normally has residual jurisdiction under Part XV, the ITLOS has residual compulsory jurisdiction in Article 292 cases. The time it would take to constitute an arbitral tribunal, and
the fact that the IQJ normally takes considerable time to decide its
cases, 3 60 make it unlikely the parties would agree on a forum other than
the ITLOS for such cases. Furthermore, if the flag state authorized an individual to pursue an Article 292 prompt release claim, the ICJ could not
hear the individual's application because only states may appear before the
ICJ in contentious cases. Thus, although the ITLOS does not have de jure
exclusive jurisdiction in prompt release cases, it may, in practice, be the
only forum that will hear such cases and thus the only forum that will
develop the law relating to the reasonableness of conditions for release. 36 1
Any new international court must attract cases, either by providing an
avenue for relief that did not previously exist or by offering benefits
unavailable in other tribunals. The manner in which the ITLOS decided its
first Article 292 prompt release case should help make the Tribunal appealing to applicants. The ITLOS's "arguable or sufficiently plausible" standard
for assessing applicants' prompt release claims may help to attract
claims. 3 62 Most significantly, the ITLOS has also acted quickly and efficiently. The ITLOS handed down its prompt release decision in the M/V
Saiga Case only three weeks after the application was filed, and the ITLOS's
Rules provide for prompt action in future cases. 363 As ITLOS President
Mensah put it, "[wie are fast, and that makes it more likely we will get a lot
36 4
of cases."
As for interstate cases that do not involve sea-bed mining or prompt
release claims, the ITLOS will have to compete with other courts or tribu359. Compare the experience of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, whose different chambers have developed inconsistent approaches on some issues. See George H. Aldrich,
What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 88 Am. J. INr'L L. 585 (1994). The Claims Tribunal lacks an
advisory jurisdiction mechanism.
360. But see Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Par. v.
U.S.) (Apr. 9, 1998) (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icj/idocket/ipaus/
ipausorder/ipaus._iorder_090498.htm> (Provisional Order) (order rendered six days
after application filed); Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of
the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.CJ. 12 (Advisory
Opinion) (Apr. 26) (decided in eight weeks). See also ICJ CommuniquE No. 98/14, Apr.
6, 1998 (outlining steps to streamline ICJ decision-making processes).
361. See also supra note 231.
362. The Tribunal might attract additional applications if, in the future, it were to
adopt a "non-restrictive interpretation" of Article 292, expanding the categories of cases
in which it will find prompt release applications to be well-founded. See supra notes 22327 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 135, 178. The Tribunal also issued its second order, for provisional measures, less than two months after the request for provisional measures was
filed.
364. Carsten Hoefer, International Sea Court To Calm the World's Stormy Seas,
DEUrSCHE PRESsE-AGENTUR, Dec. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
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nals for business. There are many grounds for preferring one tribunal over
another in a system of open competition. The expertise of the ITLOS's
judges and the high level of prestige often associated with international
courts may cause some to prefer it over arbitral tribunals. The speed with
which it is able to decide cases may give it an edge over the ICJ.3 65 The
structure or composition of various chambers also may cause disputing
parties to prefer one forum over another.
This competition will not necessarily create a serious risk of inconsistent jurisprudence. For example, when two states ask a third-party tribunal to delimit a maritime boundary or formulate a particular fisheries
management regime, it seems unlikely that significantly inconsistent jurisprudence will develop. The decisions in such cases are highly fact specific.
Furthermore, different courts and tribunals may interpret the broadly
worded governing legal standards 36 6 in similar fashion.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that various courts and tribunals may
develop inconsistent interpretations of the same legal rules. In law of the
sea cases that present similar legal issues, different courts and tribunals
may obtain jurisdiction pursuant to declarations filed under Article 287 of
the Law of the Sea Convention or pursuant to special agreements.
Although different fora may have jurisdiction in similar disputes, the possibility of inconsistent rulings seems unlikely to present significant new
problems for international law and process. First, given that multiple fora
presently hear issues of international law, the potential for divergent interpretations of law of the sea norms is a problem of degree rather than kind.
In particular, national courts often interpret international legal rules, even
with respect to matters over which international courts also have jurisdiction. 36 7 Only in a highly integrated system - something most unusual in
international law and procedure - would an international court be able to
impose its interpretations on national legal systems. 3 68 Furthermore, there
365. Sometimes, however, disputants may prefer a leisurely pace of adjudication, so
as to allow a cooling period for tensions to ease. See Richard B. Bilder, International
Dispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, inTHE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CROSSROADS 155, 165 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987).
366. E.g., several "equitable" factors relevant to deciding a maritime boundary dispute, or broadly worded community interests in the conservation of species.
367. Any divergence of interpretations is muted when national and international
courts communicate in efforts to develop acceptable interpretations of a treaty. See
AT A

Slaughter, TransjudicialCommunication, supra note 175.
368. For a description of doctrines of the ECJ that reinforce its primacy over national
courts, see supranotes 343-44, 347-48 and accompanying text. Even with respect'to the
ECJ, however, controversy continues over the problem of "kompetenz-kompetenz," i.e.,
over whether the ECJ has ultimate jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. See
J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, Constitutionalor International? The Foundationsof the

Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, inTHE EURODocnurE AND JURISPRUDENCE 227 (Anne-Marie

PEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS -

Slaughter et al. eds., 1998). Furthermore, any court at the apex of a hierarchical system
may face some inconsistent decisions. In national legal systems with a hierarchical
court structure, inconsistencies among lower courts abound, not all of which can be
resolved by a national supreme court. See Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement, supra
note 1, at 78-80, 82-84.
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is no assurance of a completely consistent jurisprudence even within a single court as its composition changes and different perspectives on international law gain currency.
Second, the risk of significantly inconsistent interpretations is minimized when judges rely on similar sources and apply similar reasoning
processes. International jurists and arbitrators may reach similar interpretations of the law even if they differ at the margins regarding its application
in close cases. This is true regardless of whether they sit on the ITLOS, the
ICJ, a chamber of one of those courts, or an arbitral tribunal. In all of these
fora, the decision makers are typically well-grounded in public international law. 36 9 In sum, because international jurists often follow a standard

method of treaty interpretation (which is likely to lead them to find many
Convention rules to be quite determinate), 3 70 and because they may rely
on the decisions of other tribunals, 3 7 1 interpretations of many rules may
3 72
not diverge significantly from tribunal to tribunal.
Third, interforum competition for cases could decrease the risk of
inconsistent jurisprudence. Different tribunals could develop a reputation
for expertise in different types of cases. A tribunal with a particular expertise may hear all the cases of one type, and inconsistent rulings will not
develop.
Fourth, it remains debatable whether inconsistent jurisprudence is
undesirable. National legal systems function quite capably when lower
courts rule inconsistently. Inconsistent rulings on minor, technical matters may help to resolve particular disputes without harming the fabric of
the rule of law. 37 3 But even if different tribunals were to interpret a mate-

rial norm in the Convention differently, that difference would simply illuminate the reality that agreement on the precise content of the norm is
369. See generally TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY,AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 173-77
(1983) (discussing the community of international lawyers). The Law of the Sea Convention's provisions for special arbitration do envision decisions by panels of experts in
some cases, and these experts may be less familiar than judges with the substance of
international law and with international legal reasoning processes. However, suggestions that the law of the sea involves only "technical" issues and is of a different jurisprudential nature from other rules of international law are belied by great similarities
between rules of the law of the sea and other rules of general international law. See
Charney, Expanding Dispute Settlement Systems, supra note 9, at 72-73. See also Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 289 (experts available to assist courts and tribunals with technical issues).
370. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. But see also supra note 261.
371. See ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 38(1)(d);Jonathan I. Charney, UniversalInternational Law, 87 Am.J. INT'L L. 529 (1993) (documenting increasing reliance on decisions of courts and tribunals to determine content of international law rules).
International courts and tribunals may, however, place somewhat more reliance on their
own prior decisions and on ICJ decisions than on decisions of other tribunals. See
Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 72-73.
372. See Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 77; Noyes, Implications, supra note 14, at 219-20. But cf. Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L.
REv. 1 (1983) (discussing implications of increase in number of cases on certainty).
373. See Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 78-80.
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lacking. 3 74 Furthermore, both for parties involved in a dispute and for
observers seeking guidance as to the state of the law, even inconsistent
interpretations of the Convention may help focus debates concerning how
a Convention norm should be applied in a particular situation.
One should ask not only whether the risk of inconsistent jurisprudence is "minimal," but also what other values might outweigh that risk.
One such value is flexibility in choosing fora. When picking a forum, disputing parties often base their choice on the identity of decision makers,
procedures, timetables, and costs associated with the various international
courts, tribunals, chambers, and less formal dispute settlement fora. The
potential for inconsistent rulings from these various fora should also be
balanced against the value of having any compulsory jurisdiction. Delegates to UNCLOS III accepted the possibility of inconsistent jurisprudence
because having only one court or tribunal to interpret the Law of the Sea
Convention would have precluded a system of compulsory binding thirdparty arbitration or adjudication. Given the varying attitudes of the participants in UNCLOS III, it was impossible for the negotiators to agree on
one forum.
B. The Risk of Parallel Proceedings
In theory, the ITLOS and another tribunal could face the same case under
Part XV of the Convention. At first glance, this scenario seems unlikely,
given that Article 287 grants jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal unless the
parties agree on another forum, and Articles 290 and 292 vest the ITLOS
with residual compulsory jurisdiction with respect to provisional measures
and prompt release cases. Nevertheless, it is possible for the same dispute
to be pursued simultaneously in two fora. For example, in a straight baseline dispute, if the coastal state and the complainant state both accept the
jurisdiction of the ITLOS under their Article 287 declarations, and the two
states each previously had filed a declaration accepting the ICJ's jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute, then parallel proceedings
are possible. Even though Article 282 of the Convention would seem to
favor recourse to the ICJ, 3 75 a dispute over jurisdiction could arise because
the scope of the ICJ's jurisdiction is not always clear.3 7 6 If the legality of
374. The drafters of the Law of the Sea Convention certainly appreciated that some
articles in the Convention were indeterminate. See, e.g., 5 CoMMENTARY, supranote 10, [
300.6 (commenting on Article 300).
375. See id. cl 282.3. Article 282 provides:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or
bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any
party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision,
that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in Part XV,
unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.
376. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 LCJ. 392 (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction of the Court and
Admissibility of the Application); D.W. Grieg, Nicaraguaand the United States: Confrontation Over the Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt, 62 BRiT. Y.B. INr'L L. 119 (1991).
The scope of Article 36(2) reservations was a central issue in dispute in the Fisheries
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the coastal state's baseline is challenged in the ITLOS, the coastal state
might seek a delay by asking the ICJ to rule on the dispute. Unless the
complainant state acquiesces in the ICJ's jurisdiction and terminates its
case in the ITLOS, or unless one court develops and uses some principle of
prudential abstention in deference to the other, there could be dual proceedings. Conceivably each court could enter a judgment in the same case,
with the ITLOS hypothesizing that the ICJ did not have proper jurisdiction
3 77
and the ICJ later ruling that it did.
Parallel proceedings in national courts, involving private parties from
different states, have posed vexatious problems. Duplicative litigation has
led to inconsistent results. To mitigate the problems of parallel proceedings, courts have developed various priority or prudential abstention
devices. These devices include forum non conveniens, a rule of deference to
the court where the case was first filed, and various balancing tests that
may result in a stay or dismissal of one pending case
(or, alternatively, an
3 78
injunction against proceeding in the other court).
The prospect of parallel proceedings in interstate law of the sea disputes appears remote. The priorities laid out in Articles 282, 287, and 290
will solve the jurisdictional question in most cases. Under the Law of the
3 79
Sea Convention, where jurisdiction is based only on mutual consent,
the possibility of duplicative proceedings is minimal. It also is far from
certain that litigants would expend the considerable resources necessary to
pursue parallel interstate litigation in different international courts, even if
such an option were available.
Choice-of-law considerations suggest that the risk of inconsistent
judgments in parallel law of the sea proceedings is far less likely than in
JurisdictionCase, resolved in 1998 against Spain and in favor of Canada. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.) (Dec. 4, 1998) (Jurisdiction) (visited Dec. 14, 1998) <http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iec/iecjudgment(s)/iec..ijudgment_981204.htm>. Even
when Article 36(2) declarations include no reservations, states still have managed to

formulate preliminary objections. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.) (June 11, 1998) (Preliminary
Objections Judgment) (visited Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
icn/icnjudgment/icnjijudgment_98061 1_content.htm>.
377. Disputes over jurisdiction also could arise, for example, between states that were

parties to a bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty that referred
disputes related to its interpretation or application to the ICJ. See, e.g., Treaty of Friend-

ship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3 and Dec. 26, 1951, U.S.-Greece, art. XXVI(2), 5
U.S.T. 1829, 1913. States might debate whether a dispute involving maritime matters
fell within the scope of the FCN Treaty, and whether deference was due to the ICJ under
Article 282 of the Law of the Sea Convention on the grounds that the dispute was one

"concerning the interpretation or application of th[e] Convention."
378. See, e.g., LouisE ELLEN Tarrz, TRANSNATnONAL LinGAnON §§ 7-1 to 7-5 (1996).
The issues occasionally arise in international tribunals. See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO
Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, in GATT/WTO DispumE SrL=EmENT, supra note 167, at 413, 435-36 (discussing
abstention issues related to dual proceedings in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body and
a World Intellectual Property Organization forum).
379. This consent may be expressed by mutual acceptance of the Law of the Sea Convention itself, another treaty or agreement providing for the jurisdiction of a particular
court or tribunal, or a special agreement entered into after a dispute has arisen.
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parallel national court proceedings. The plaintiff in each national court
will typically have sought a forum that is likely to choose a law leading to a
favorable judgment on the merits or a favorable antisuit injunction. In parallel national court proceedings, each national court may well apply its
own state's law, which could potentially lead to inconsistent results. In
parallel law of the sea proceedings, however, each international tribunal is
applying the same international law, thereby minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent outcomes.
Even in the "worst case" scenario in which the ITLOS and another
international court or tribunal reached inconsistent judgments in the same
law of the sea case, the parties would still be no worse off - and perhaps
better off - than if there were no decision. The two fora could reject some
of the competing claims, which would narrow the scope of subsequent
negotiations between the parties in their continuing efforts to resolve their
dispute.
Some disputes may overlap previously unrelated legal regimes, each
with a binding dispute settlement system. Consider, for example, the connection between international trade and law of the sea disputes. Assume
that the government of a maritime power (Y) is upset at the refusal of a
coastal state claiming straight baselines (X) to allow foreign flag vessels to
fish on a "high seas" rise within X's asserted EEZ - a rise that would not
be within X's EEZ if X used a normal baseline. Y therefore issues trade
sanctions to prevent the import of all fish from X. If X and Y are Member
States of the World Trade Organization (WTO), X could challenge the legality of Y's unilateral trade sanctions before a WTO dispute settlement
panel. 38 0 The resulting decision would be legally binding. 3 8 ' Could the
ITLOS then also hear Y's claim challenging the legality of X's actions? The
answer appears to be affirmative if X and Y have both selected the ITLOS
under Article 287 of the Law of the Sea Convention. Article 282 of the
Convention requires deference to another tribunal (here, a WTO panel)
only if the parties mutually agree to submit "a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of [the Law of the Sea] Convention" to that alternative tribunal. X's challenge of Y's trade sanctions before a WTO panel
380. For discussion of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in General Agreements on Tariffs and

Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1216 (1994), and prospects for its future,
see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, InternationalTrade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in GATT/WTO DispuTE SETL.EMENT, supranote
167, at 1, 54-122. Before January 1, 1995, GATT panel decisions could be blocked by
the disadvantaged state. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding removes that
option. The Understanding also establishes a clear timetable for proceedings before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, creates a new appellate procedure, and describes means
of implementing formal rulings. For an overview of activity by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see WTO, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (visited Nov. 9,
1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>.
381. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding- Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1997).
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should not preclude litigation of the dispute over X's baselines - a dispute
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention - before
the ITLOS.

38 2

If X and Y were to pursue their disputes under the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding and before the ITLOS, the resulting decisions
might be compatible. 38 3 To pick just one permutation of the hypothetical
baselines example, the ITLOS might rule that X's straight baseline is illegal
because it does not meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Law of the Sea
Convention, while a WTO panel might rule that Y's unilateral sanctions
were illegal under the GATT. The two results would not be inconsistent;
the losing state in each case could correct its illegal behavior and comply
with the relevant judgment.
The analysis becomes more difficult if the ITLOS were to pass judgment on the legality of Y's unilateral trade sanctions. Although most commentators believe that the Law of the Sea Convention does not authorize
the various courts or tribunals recognized in Part XV to address trade law
disputes, the issue is problematic. 38 4 The Convention addresses this issue
generally when it specifies the sources of law that the ITLOS and other
tribunals are authorized to apply. 38 5 The ITLOS,in applying "other rules
of international law not incompatible with" the Convention, 38 6 seemingly
could address the law governing permissible countermeasures or remedies
in the baselines dispute.
If the ITLOS's decision on the permissibility of Y's trade sanctions did
conflict with that of the WTO panel, a question of hierarchy of procedures
would arise. Article 311 of the Convention, read literally, suggests that the
Convention's mechanisms would "trump" the WTO's mechanisms.
According to Article 311, agreements among States Parties "modifying ...the operation of provisions of'the Convention are permissible only
if "such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of this
Convention." 38 7 To maintain the integrity of the well-established WTO system, in which the issue of permissible trade sanctions is central, the ITLOS
might adopt a prudential abstention rule, refusing to pass judgment on the
legality of trade sanctions governed by the WTO Agreement. This question
382. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes Over the Protection of
GEO. IN'L ENVT'L L. RE v. 29, 72

Marine Living Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10
(1997).

383. The 1994 Part X1 Agreement, supra note 4, explicitly addresses the relative priority of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber and GATT or WTO panels with respect to disputes
over the subsidization of sea-bed mining. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
Part XV of the Law of the Sea Convention, by contrast, contains no explicit references to
GATT/WTO panels.
384. See McLaughlin, supra note 382, at 52-53, 73 n.66. But cf. Part XI Agreement,
supra note 4, Annex, §§ 6.1(0, 6.4 (authorizing Convention mechanism to take up subsidization disputes related to sea-bed mining, but only if parties to the dispute are not all
parties to the GATT/WTO).
385. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
386. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 293(1).
387. Id. art. 311(3). See McLaughlin, supra note 382, at 57-59, 74-76.
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of hierarchy is thus transformed into a question of reaching an accommodation among different international regimes.
Conclusion
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has jurisdiction over
many different types of disputes, and it may address issues that fall within
different regimes. The ITLOS may be called on to exercise different types
of judicial functions. It may be asked to order the release of a detained
vessel, which is a function often assigned to admiralty courts in national
legal systems. At other times, the ITLOS, or one of its chambers, may serve
as a quasi-legislature, as a public forum for the airing of interstate grievances, as a court of equity, or as a court charged with reviewing the legality
of an international institution's actions. In each situation, the ITLOS must
be sensitive to what it can contribute to the relationships among different
entities.
The flexibility in choice of fora incorporated in the design of the Law
of the Sea Convention gives rise to concerns about inconsistent jurisprudence. Such concerns should be evaluated in light of the jurisdictional and
functional analyses discussed in Parts I and II of this Article. When only
one forum is able to hear certain types of cases, concerns over inconsistent
rulings in those cases are minimal. For example, the fact that the ITLOS
has residual compulsory jurisdiction in Article 292 prompt release cases,
combined with the ITLOS's efforts to decide such cases quickly, suggest
that it will not face competition in such cases. Similarly, the ITLOS's SeaBed Disputes Chamber or its chambers, rather than arbitral tribunals, will
decide sea-bed mining disputes that involve interpretation of Part XI of the
Convention.
The risk of inconsistent jurisprudence is also low if the various courts
and tribunals decide few cases. Many of the disputes that the ITLOS could
hear are interstate disputes. States are often reluctant to pursue formal
actions against other states for political reasons. Disincentives to interstate
adjudication (e.g., concern that litigation may prove ineffective, or states'
desire to retain control over sensitive disputes) suggest that the new ITLOS
may decide few interstate cases. 388 On the other hand, those international
courts and tribunals that boast a significant volume of cases often allow
individual access. Some private parties may appear before the ITLOS
because states may elect to allow individuals to pursue Article 292 prompt
release claims, and because individuals and corporations have access to the
388. It seems unlikely that the ITLOS's interstate caseload will rival that of the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body, which since 1994 has rendered dozens of binding decisions in
international trade disputes. The WTO, unlike the Law of the Sea Convention, does not
allow states a choice among formal dispute settlement mechanisms. Years of experimentation with less formal GATT dispute settlement mechanisms, coupled with a perceived
need to resolve urgent trade disputes quickly, may also contribute to states' willingness
to use the new WTO dispute settlement system. See MERRILLS, supra note 45, at 287;
John E. Noyes, Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement: Past, Present, and Future, 5 ILSAJ. IN'L
& CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1999).
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ITLOS's Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber in sea-bed mining disputes. If the
ITLOS were to accept jurisdiction in matters provided for in agreements
involving private parties that confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal,38 9 the
Tribunal's caseload could expand significantly.
In any event, the promotion of stable international legal norms is only
one of several important judicial roles. International courts can also fulfill
other functions important to the operation of international relationships.
If the ITLOS is able to help states or individuals to settle their disputes, or
is able to engage national courts in a dialogue about the integration of
international standards on the release of vessels into national legal systems,
or is able to work cooperatively with the Sea-Bed Authority to promote a
stable legal environment for the deep sea-bed, its contributions to a range
of ongoing relationships may be significant. The prospects for such contributions are real, and they likely outweigh the risk of inconsistent rulings
among the ITLOS and other courts and tribunals.

389. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.

